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Abstract 
 This work is devoted to criticisms of libertarian philosophers who attempt to 
provide an account of agent freedom that relies solely upon indeterminism.  First, the 
philosophy of Robert Kane is examined.  I argue that Kane’s account does not succeed as 
an intelligible libertarian account of freedom and at best makes compatibilist accounts 
more intuitive.  I next examine objections to indeterminist accounts as lodged by Galen 
Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Daniel Dennett, and Richard Double before turning to an 
analysis of a debate among Peter van Inwagen, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza.  
Van Inwagen argues that we are seldom able to do other than we do but as long as we are 
in some way responsible for this inability then this does not entail that we can only rarely 
be held responsible.  Typical cases are those in which an agent’s character determines a 
particular action and the agent is responsible for having the character she has.  Fischer 
and Ravizza argue that van Inwagen’s account is empty because the character of an agent 
is formed at an early age by forces beyond her control. 
 I conclude by arguing, pace Kane and van Inwagen, that even if an action is 
determined by an agent’s character and the agent is responsible for having that character, 
we still may not be able to hold the agent responsible in a significant amount of cases.  
Additionally, I attempt to provide a compatibilist solution to the problem of free will in 
an attempt to show that the ability to do otherwise is not relevant to the problem of free 
will. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a classical tradition in philosophy that is characterized by a debate 
between compatibilism and incompatibilism.1  The former position holds that free will is 
compatible with the thesis of determinism and the latter argues that it is not.  The 
importance of this debate can be seen by considering the relationship between free will 
and moral responsibility.  In order to hold an agent responsible for a state of affairs that 
results from an action he performed, it is generally required that the agent must have had 
a choice concerning whether or not he would perform the action.  It must be true that the 
agent could have done other than what he in fact did.  If the resulting action was not one 
the agent had a choice about performing, we would not tend to hold him responsible for 
that action.  While driving, the brakes in Susan’s new car malfunction resulting in her 
Ford plowing through an intersection and hitting a Datsun.  An insurance investigator 
later determines that the brakes in Susan’s car were defective and installed incorrectly by 
the manufacturer.  Because of this Susan should not be held responsible for the action, 
she had no choice concerning whether or not the car she was driving would hit another.     
Most incompatibilists play on this relationship between free will and 
responsibility to argue that the thesis of determinism must be false.  In this vein, 
incompatibilists have provided several reductio arguments against the truth of 
determinism.  These typically begin by assuming the truth of determinism and then 
showing it has as a consequence that no one is ever able to do other than what they have 
done.  If this were true, then it would seem that no one could be held responsible for his 
or her actions.  Suppose Susan had known in advance about the faulty brakes yet chose to 
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drive the Ford anyway.  If determinism were true, so the arguments go, we would still not 
be able to hold Susan responsible for the resulting accident.  This is because every 
choice, including her decision to drive with faulty brakes, is mere illusion.  Her deciding 
to drive the car is akin to a rock deciding that it will fall to the Earth when dropped.  
Since this conclusion is phenomenologically absurd, determinism is shown (in the minds 
of incompatibilists) to be false. 
In this introductory chapter, I discuss the various positions held by compatibilists 
and incompatibilists.  This discussion will be brief because the positions are dealt with 
extensively throughout the course of the next several chapters.  
1.1 Incompatibilists   
Incompatibilist philosophers can be divided into two camps.  In the first camp are 
the hard determinists.  The hard determinist agrees that free will is not compatible with 
determinism but, unlike the other incompatibilists, concludes that free will does not exist.  
Examples of hard determinist include Thomas Hobbes, Arthur Schopenhauer, J. S. Mill, 
and Ted Honderich.2  Hobbes, Schopenhauer and Mill are psychological determinists and 
argue that an agent is always determined to act by his strongest desire that is in turn 
determined by his heredity and upbringing.  In the second camp are the libertarians.  The 
libertarians are the incompatibilists of the ilk mentioned in the previous paragraph, those 
that argue that determinism is false.  The libertarians can further be divided into two 
groups.  The first group relies upon special types of entities or special forms of causation 
to gain libertarian freedom.  Immanuel Kant and Roderick Chisholm represent this group.  
The second show a naturalist streak by relying solely upon indeterminism to gain 
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libertarian free will.  Examples of libertarian indeterminists are Robert Kane and Peter 
van Inwagen.   
Libertarians of any stripe argue that there are conditions that are necessary for the 
existence of free will.  One such condition is, generally, that free will cannot exist if 
agents can never do other than what they in fact do.  This is the familiar worry discussed 
earlier that all choice is but a mere illusion.  This worry can be couched in terms of 
alternate possibilities.  If determinism is true, then there is but a single open possibility 
ahead of us.  No alternative possibilities could exist.  Because there are no alternative 
possibilities open to us, it would be true that in every situation we lack the ability to other 
than what we do. 
Generally, some form of allowance is given for actions that are determined by an 
agent’s character.  Because of the good character that she has developed, Mother Teresa 
was unable to turn away from someone in need.  Although it is true that in each particular 
instance of not turning away she could not have done other that what she did do, we can 
hold her responsible for her actions because she was responsible for forming her 
character.  If an agent is responsible for forming her character, then she is also held 
responsible for actions that are determined by that character.   
Libertarians of the indeterminist variety also tend to shun the libertarians who rely 
upon special entities or special forms of causation to gain freedom.  The indeterminist 
typically finds these to be unintelligible and argue that their implausibility hurts the 
libertarian cause more than helps. 
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1.2 Compatibilists 
Though compatibilists argue that free will is compatible with determinism, most 
do not argue further that determinism is necessary for free will.  Rather, free will is 
compatible with both determinism and indeterminism.  However, they would not agree 
with the incompatibilist that indeterminism can make a meaningful contribution to 
solving the problem of free will.  They argue that no intelligible account of libertarian 
free agency has been proposed (nor can be).  Just because an action is not determined 
does not seem to make it an action for which an agent can be held responsible.  A typical 
compatibilist criticism of indeterminists is that there is no place that indeterminism can 
be introduced that would result in actions for which agents can be held responsible.  
Indeterminism seems to be just chance, and it is hard to see how simple chance aids the 
libertarian.  The picture painted by these critics is bleak.  We return to when Susan was 
deliberating about whether or not to drive her Ford knowing that the brakes do not work.  
She decides to do the right thing and leave the car in the driveway.  However, before she 
actually does so, indeterminism interferes and alters her decision so that she ends up 
having the accident.  In examples like this the introduction of indeterminism serves as a 
barrier to freedom and not as an aid to it. 
Compatibilists typically equate free will with the freedom of an agent to do 
whatever it is he wants to do.  So long as I am not coerced by others or by circumstance 
from doing what I desire, I am free.  Thus we can distinguish between my walking across 
a street because it is what I desire and my being forcibly blown across the same street by 
a strong wind.  In the first case, I was free.  In the latter, not. 
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Compatibilists also argue that even if determinism were true it would not be the 
case that there are no alternate possibilities open to us.  This is typically done in two 
ways.  The first is to provide a conditional analysis of the phrase “could have done 
otherwise” that is compatible with determinism.  “Could have done otherwise” is equated 
to “could have done otherwise if the agent had chosen to do so.”  The second way is to 
discuss alternative possibilities in terms of possible worlds.  Though it is true that in this 
world I could not have done other than perform action A, there are other possible worlds 
in which I refrain from performing A.  These possible worlds somehow account for our 
ability to do other than what we do. 
 Of course, none of these compatibilist strategies are acceptable to the 
incompatibilist.  The compatibilist freedom to do what we want, they argue, is irrelevant 
if we are not also free to want what we want.  And this, the freedom to want what we 
want, is not compatible with determinism.  Additionally, conditional analysis of “could 
have done otherwise” are not acceptable nor is the use of other possible worlds to explain 
alternative possibilities.  For the former, the ability to do otherwise if we had chosen to 
otherwise seems empty when it is added that we lack the ability to choose otherwise in a 
determined world.  For the latter, what we are able to do in another possible world is not 
relevant to the discussion of free will.  The problem of free will deals exclusively with 
our freedom or lack thereof in this world, not any other possible one. 
1.3 Looking Ahead 
My main interest in this work is to examine the libertarian philosophy of the 
indeterminist.  I am doing so in order to discover whether the critics are correct when 
they argue that indeterminism cannot aid in gaining free will and that no account of free 
- 6 - 
will or free agency (specifically indeterminist or generally libertarian) has been given.  In 
order to do to so I examine the work of Robert Kane, a leading indeterminist philosopher.  
In chapter two, I first describe how Kane uses indeterminism to gain freedom and provide 
several criticisms to his account.  Most notably, that his account is not intelligible after all 
and that, at best, it makes compatibilist accounts of freedom and free agency more 
intuitive.   
 In the philosophical literature there are standard objections against indeterminist 
accounts of freedom and free agency.  In chapter three, I examine four such objections as 
provided by Galen Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Daniel Dennett, and Richard Double.  
Galen Strawson questions whether indeterminism can be placed in any place that matters 
to questions of free will.  Strawson’s challenge to the indeterminist is that it is not enough 
to merely deny the truth of determinism, they must also provide an intelligible theory of 
freedom and free agency in which indeterminism plays a vital role.  Nagel discusses the 
problem of autonomy.  His worry is that the idea that we freely perform our actions is 
merely an illusion.  We really do not act at all, but rather what we do is only what 
happens through natural and physical law.  Though typically this criticism is lodged 
against compatibilists, it can also serve as a criticism to libertarians who are 
indeterminists.  Like Strawson, Dennett also wonders where indeterminism can be 
introduced such that it makes a difference in the problem of free will.  Unlike Strawson, 
Dennett additionally wonders about the nature of the indeterminism involved.  Double 
lodges what I refer to as an objection from rational explanation against the indeterminist.  
He examines the indeterminist libertarian philosophies of Kane and Peter van Inwagen 
and questions how the actions that the agents perform can be considered rational.  After 
doing so, I question whether any indeterminist account of freedom or free agency can 
answer these four objections and still somehow obtain libertarian freedom. 
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 In chapter four, I disregard the various objections that have been raised against 
indeterminist accounts of freedom.  I do so in order to question whether, even if all the 
previous objections are answered satisfactorily, indeterminist theories of agency do not 
face further problems.  To do so, I follow a philosophical debated between van Inwagen 
on one side and John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza on the other.  As I have 
mentioned previously, van Inwagen is an indeterminist libertarian philosopher.  What I 
have not mentioned is that van Inwagen is responsible for several of the arguments that 
purport to show that determinism is false.  Van Inwagen argues that in order to be an 
incompatibilist, one must rely upon a rule of reference similar to a rule that he has 
developed that he calls “Rule Beta.”  In addition to this, van Inwagen argues that the 
falsity of determinism does not imply that agents are actually able to do other than they 
do in a significant amount of cases.  However, van Inwagen argues that this does not 
result in any appreciable decrease in the amount of actions for which an agent can be held 
responsible.  
 In the final chapter, chapter five, I conclude that indeterminist philosophers have 
not adequately answered the objections raised by myself and the philosophers discussed 
in chapter three.  I additionally briefly sketch two further problems for the indeterminist.  
I first question whether it is appropriate to hold agents responsible for actions that flow 
from their character (supposing that they are responsible for having the characters they 
have).  If we cannot do so (and I don’t think there is any indisputable reason why we 
should), then van Inwagen would be wrong.  Our inability to do other than we do in a 
significant amount of cases does result in an appreciable decrease in the amount of 
actions for which an agent can be held responsible.  Second, I attempt to bolster the 
compatibilist position in order to show that several devices used by indeterminists (and 
libertarians in general) are not relevant with respect to the problem of free will.  Most 
notably, I question the relevance of the ability to do otherwise and the necessity for 
indeterminism. 
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1.4 End Notes 
 
1 Van Inwagen, in O’Connor (1996), 219. 
 
2 Schopenhauer (1960); Honderich (1988).  The relevant work by Hobbes can be found in 
Molesworth (1962); a relevant work by Mill is “From an Examination of Sir William 
Hamilton’s Philosophy” and can be found in Morgenbesser and Walsh (1962), 57-69. 
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2. Robert Kane’s Incompatibilism 
In The Significance of Free Will, Robert Kane offers an incompatibilist account of 
freedom of the will that differs from most of his libertarian brethren. Kane divides his 
book into two sections.  In the first, he addresses the questions of compatibility and 
significance – the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism and the 
question of why we should want to possess a free will that is incompatible with 
determinism.  In the second part, he addresses the questions of intelligibility and 
existence – the question of whether sense can be made of free will that is not compatible 
with determinism and the question of whether such a freedom exists in the natural world.  
I devote the first two sections of this chapter to explaining Kane’s answers to these four 
questions.  In the third section, I argue that Kane’s answer to the second and third are not 
adequate. 
2.1. Compatibility and Significance 
In this section I discuss Kane’s answers to the compatibility and significance 
questions.  Kane takes free will in the traditional sense very seriously and argues that it is 
entailed by a condition of ultimate responsible that is not compatible with the truth of 
determinism.  Additionally, he argues that the traditional sense of free will is a significant 
freedom that is worth wanting. 
2.1.1. Taking Free Will Seriously 
Unlike compatibilist philosophers who prefer to speak in terms of free action, 
Kane holds freedom of the will to be of primary import.  This is so because he takes the 
traditional idea of the will very seriously as opposed to other modern philosophers who 
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use the term free will as a nod to philosophical tradition when they are actually referring 
to free action.  For Kane, free will is “the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or 
originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes” whereas free action is merely 
“to be unhindered in the pursuit of your purposes”(4) regardless of the ultimate origin of 
those purposes.   
Kane’s traditional definition of free will goes hand in hand with traditional 
notions of moral responsibility – we hold whoever is the ultimate cause of the action 
responsible for the products of the action.  If I intentionally push Sheila in front of a bus, 
I am morally responsible for her murder.  If John intentionally pushes me into Sheila so 
that the bus will hit her, then John is responsible for her murder and my body was merely 
his instrument.  The second case is uncontroversial and both Kane and compatibilists 
would agree that John, not I, is the guilty party.  The first case is another story.  Kane 
would only hold me responsible if the ultimate cause of my action rested within me.  If 
the chain of causality can be traced outside of myself, say to my genetic history or my 
environment, then I am not the culprit.  Though I did, say, internally form an intention 
and purpose to push Sheila, I could exhibit no control over whether or not the intention 
arose and whether or not I acted upon it. Kane would not hold me morally responsible 
because of the importance of free will, while a compatibilist, acting under the definition 
of free action, would hold me responsible so long as the action I performed was the 
action that I wanted to perform. 
 Kane traces this divergence in the modern era to the debates between Hobbes and 
Bramhall.1  The differences between Kane and compatibilists can be seen clearly via an 
analysis of this debate.  Hobbes took the free action position and argued that freedom of 
   
- 11 - 
the will as traditionally defined is unintelligible.  Freedoms ordinarily desired by humans, 
he argued, freedom from physical restraint, coercion, compulsion, and oppression, are 
compatible with determinism.  We are free so long as we are self-determining, and we are 
self-determining so long as nothing prevents us from doing what we will.  This type of 
freedom can be possessed even though what we want or intend to do is determined by 
antecedent circumstances or causes.   
 Bramhall took the traditional free will position, arguing that the type of freedom 
professed by Hobbes is no freedom at all.  True freedom of the will, the freedom that 
does matter, is not only the freedom to do what we will, but also the additional freedom 
for the will to determine itself.  Without this freedom we are like the falling rock that is 
able to do whatever it wills so long as it wills to go down.  Hobbes responded by pointing 
out a dilemma that still haunts libertarian accounts of free will. 
 In order for the will to have ultimate control over itself, Hobbes noted, some of its 
acts must be undetermined.  But undetermined actions do not equate to freedom because 
whatever is undetermined is not controlled by anything, the will and agent included.  The 
libertarian dilemma is one of either confusion or emptiness, the confusion of equating 
freedom with indeterminism or the emptiness of positing accounts of self-determination 
that could not be explained.2  Kane (obviously) sides with Bramhall in the debate but 
agrees that no intelligible answer to the libertarian dilemma has been presented.  Before 
he can attempt to do so, he must first demonstrate that there is a type of freedom worth 
wanting, an intelligible freedom, that compatibilist freedoms do not encompass.  He must 
justify his libertarianism by demonstrating that it better captures our intuitions than the 
compatibilist position.  The rest of this section will detail how he does this. 
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 The traditional question of whether freedom is compatible with determinism is 
too simple for Kane because it implies that there is only one type of freedom at hand.   
There are actually many kinds of freedom involved in philosophic debate, as seen earlier 
in the distinction made between free action and free will.  The question is best formed 
thusly: “Is freedom in every significant sense worth wanting compatible with 
determinism?”(14).  For Kane to succeed he does not need to show that no significant 
type of freedom worth wanting is compatible with determinism - he admits that many of 
them are compatible.  All he must demonstrate is that there is at least one significant type 
of freedom that is not compatible with determinism to show that the compatibilist 
position is untenable.  This freedom is, of course, freedom of the will. 
A traditional argument against compatibilism rests upon the idea of alternate 
possibilities as a necessary condition of freedom of the will.  In the next sub-section, I 
discuss Kane’s treatment of alternate possibilities and show why he rightly claims that it 
alone is not sufficient to show that compatibilism is lacking. 
2.1.2 Could Have Done Otherwise – Alternate Possibilities (AP) 
Kane provides an analysis for determining whether or not an action is “up to an 
agent” in the sense necessary for ascription of free will as follows: 
(AP) The agent has alternate possibilities (or can do otherwise) with 
respect to A (an action) at time t in the sense that, at t, the agent can (has 
the power or ability to) do A and can (has the power or ability to) do 
otherwise. (33) 
 
This is central to the notion that an agent should not be held responsible for an action if 
he was unable to do other than he did.  Under normal circumstances we are held 
responsible for the results of our actions because we seem to have a choice concerning 
which actions to undertake.  Though Harry has chosen to see Black Hawk Down at the 
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theater it is also true that he could have chosen not to go in favor of riding his bicycle by 
a lake.  He could have done either and because of this he is responsible for that action he 
does actually do.3  However, if Harry was hypnotized in such a way that whenever he is 
faced with a choice of going to the theater or going for a bicycle ride he will always 
choose the bicycle ride, then it is not true, in this limited situation, that Harry is able to do 
other than go to the theater.  Not being able to do otherwise undermines freedom and 
responsibility and is a threat to compatibilism.  If determinism is true, then it would seem 
that it is never the case that an agent could have done other than what he does in fact do. 
 Compatibilists have mainly attempted to refute this in two ways.  First, they have 
argued that it is not necessarily the case that we do not hold agents responsible in cases 
where it is agreed that they could not have done otherwise.  Second, they have argued 
that even if determinism were true there are analyses of “can” and “could” with which it 
is true that agents could have done otherwise and can do otherwise. Kane discusses 
Dennett’s Martin Luther example and Frankfurt’s Black and Jones example in reference 
to the former.4 
 Dennett argues that when Martin Luther broke with the Church of Rome and 
stated, “Here I stand.  I can do no other,” it was true that Luther could not have done 
otherwise yet we still hold Luther’s act as one for which he can be held accountable.  
With his statement, Luther was taking full responsibility for his action rather than 
avoiding responsibility.  If this were so, a condition like AP would be necessary neither 
for moral responsibility nor free will in any sense worth wanting.  Rather than caring 
about whether an agent could have done otherwise when assigning moral responsibility, 
Dennett argues, we consider whether the consequences that flow from the action are good 
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or bad and also whether or not praising or blaming the agent for the action can modify the 
agent’s and other agents’ future actions.  If Sam steals a car and, like Luther, his 
character was such that he could not have done other than do as he did, we would hold 
Sam as morally blameworthy and punish him because it would make Sam and others like 
him less likely to perform unacceptable acts in the future.  This is so because agents 
generally do not wish to be on the receiving end of such punishment.   
 Kane cites Dworkin5 as providing an adequate refutation of this last point.  
Dworkin notes that moral ascription of this sort are inadequate because they are forward 
looking and do not take into account whether or not a person deserves to be praised or 
blamed for his action.  In order to determine whether an agent is blameworthy or 
praiseworthy, we must look to the past and not the future and examine how the agent 
came to be the type of person that they are.  In the case of Luther, moral accountability 
depends upon whether Luther is responsible for being the sort of person that he was at the 
time, not upon whether the future effects of holding him responsible would be favorable. 
 Kane agrees wholeheartedly with the last of this.  In order for an agent to be held 
morally responsible, it is not necessary that they could have been able to do otherwise in 
every single instance so long as the agent is ultimately responsible for his inability to do 
otherwise.  For Luther, this would be so because at some point in Luther’s past he could 
have done otherwise, he could have chosen to keep his faith private, and thus would not 
be in the position described.  At some point he could have done otherwise.  
 In Frankfurt’s Black and Jones example, Black is an evil neurosurgeon with direct 
control over Jones’ brain and has intimate knowledge of Jones’ proclivities.  Black wants 
Jones to perform a certain act, say, voting for Bush in the primary election.  Black knows 
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Jones well enough to predict which way he will go.  If things are going such that it looks 
like Jones will vote for Gore, Black will press a button which overrides Jones’ will and 
forces him to vote for Bush.  If it looks like Jones is going to vote for Bush, however, 
Black will do nothing and Jones will follow his own will and cast his vote.  In this latter 
alternative, it appears that Jones can be held responsible for his vote for Bush even if, as 
the first alternative shows, Jones could not have done other than vote for Bush.  If he 
were leaning towards Gore, Black would have known and forced the Bush vote.  Kane 
uses examples like this as an argument that AP does not sufficiently show that 
compatibilism is false.  This is because, as shown in the Luther example, Kane does agree 
that we can be held responsible in cases where we could not have done otherwise.  
Similarly in the Black and Jones example, Jones can be held responsible for his vote for 
Bush in the second alternative even if he could not have done otherwise.  However, in 
either alternative of the Black and Jones example, more investigation is required to 
determine whether Jones should be held responsible.  In the former case, we would not 
hold Jones responsible after examining his past because we could see that he was going 
to vote for Gore until Black interfered.  In the latter case, we may or may not hold Jones 
responsible for his vote depending upon whether or not Jones was responsible for having 
the type of character that necessitated a vote for Bush.   
 What both cases show for Kane is that AP is not sufficient reason to be an 
incompatibilist, but AP does point to something that is sufficient, ultimate responsibility, 
which will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
 The second way that compatibilists have argued against AP is arguing that even if 
determinism were true there are analyses of “can” and “could” with which it is true that 
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agents could have done otherwise and can do otherwise.  Kane discusses these in terms of 
van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument, which states: 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of 
nature and events in the remote past.  But it is not up to us what went on 
before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are.  
Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) 
are not up to us.6 
 
If this is correct, then if we were able to do otherwise it is in our power to either change 
the past or falsify a law of nature.  Since we can do neither, then it must be true that if 
determinism is true we are unable to do otherwise.  Kane claims that this argument does 
succeed for free will, unless the compatibilist can provide a compatibilist account of can 
or power that succeeds. 
 Kane discusses several attempts by compatibilists to show that the argument does 
not hold.  A traditional analysis of “could have done otherwise” is the conditional 
analysis.  Within the “could” is a buried conditional – “could have done otherwise” 
becomes “could have done otherwise if the agent had so chosen”.  This analysis is 
compatible with determinism because it can be true that an agent could have done 
otherwise if the agent had so chosen while it also being determined that the agent could 
not have so chosen.  Van Inwagen considers and rejects this analysis because from it we 
can deduce that an agent could change the past or break a law of nature if the agent so 
chose, and that seems false if not simply very counterintuitive.   
 However, David Lewis has argued that this can be made sense of if a “weak 
sense” of “being able to render a proposition false” is employed.7  I can render false a 
proposition in the “strong sense” just in case “I was able to do something such that, if I 
did it, the proposition would have been falsified, either by my act itself or by some event 
caused by my act.”8  I can render false a proposition in the “weak sense” just in case “I 
   
- 17 - 
was able to do something such that, if I did it, the proposition would have been falsified 
(though not necessarily by my act, or by any event caused by my act).”9  The weak sense 
only entails that if an agent had acted otherwise, then a law of nature would have been 
different, not that the agent caused the law of nature to be different.  In this weak sense, it 
is true that we can render a law of nature false.  [But it is not clear to me that rendering a 
law of nature false actually amounts to anything.  The laws of nature are immutable.  If a 
law of nature were broken in the strong sense, we would perhaps say that we were 
mistaken about the status of the law in the first place.  For example, if a particle is 
discovered that travels faster than the speed of light, we would not say that a law of 
nature had been broken but rather that Einstein was wrong about what the laws were.  
The case of the weak sense is not comparable to the strong sense.  What passes for 
breaking a law of nature in Lewis’ weak sense is merely the claim that the laws of nature 
could have been different and, hence, could have necessitated a different action than the 
action it did in fact necessitate.  Rather than claiming that an individual breaks a law of 
nature in any sense, it would be more appropriate to say that the law of nature breaks the 
individual.10] 
 Kane notes that conditional analyses of “could have done otherwise” have also 
come under attack by J. L. Austin and Roderick Chisholm.11  Austin argues that the 
statement: 
(C) You could have done otherwise. 
cannot be equivalent to the statements: 
(CI) You could have done otherwise, if you had willed or chosen or 
wanted to do otherwise. 
or 
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(WI) You would have done otherwise, if you had willed or chosen or 
wanted to do otherwise. 
 
CI cannot be correct because it makes the existence of a power or ability to do something 
dependent upon an agent’s willing or choosing to exercise the power or ability.  It is 
absurd to say that I do not have powers that I do not exercise, for surely I have the power 
to jump off the Empire State Building even if I never choose to do so.  Additionally, WI 
cannot be adequate because it implies that we can succeed in doing whatever we set out 
to do.  The example Austin gives is of a three-foot putt.  Making the putt is certainly 
within his power, but that does not mean that he is guaranteed of making it should he 
attempt it.  After missing the putt it is true that Austin could have chosen to make the 
putt, but that does not entail that he would have made the putt. 
 Chisholm argues that WI and CI do not adequately capture the truth of C unless a 
further condition is added: 
(C’) You could also have willed or chosen otherwise. 
However, C’ introduces the troublesome “could” again which calls for another 
conditional analysis: 
(WI’) You would have chosen otherwise, if you had willed to choose 
otherwise. 
that, in turn, requires another C’ type condition stating that one could have willed to 
choose otherwise, and so on.  Chisholm points out that this would regress infinitely with 
each subsequent WI requiring a C’ and each C’ requiring a further WI’.  The regress 
would not allow for the elimination of “could”. 
 These differences have resulted in an impasse over the importance of AP.  Kane 
thinks that neither the compatibilist nor the incompatibilist has provided a case 
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convincing enough to the other.  He argues that this is so because a condition like AP is 
not sufficient to eliminate the compatibilist position.  More is required, in this case the 
joint condition of ultimate responsibility (UR). 
2.1.3. Ultimate Responsibility (UR, U and R) 
Kane argues that AP alone is not enough to win the day for incompatibilists - 
“focusing on the power to do otherwise and alternative possibilities alone is just too thin 
a basis on which to rest the case for incompatibilism” (59).  In addition to AP, and what 
in fact AP and most debates concerning free will point towards, is condition UR which is 
made up of two subconditions, U and R: 
(UR)  An agent is ultimately responsible for some (event or state) E’s 
occurring only if (R) the agent is personally responsible for E’s occurring 
in a sense which entails that something the agent voluntarily (or willingly) 
did or omitted, and for which the agent could have voluntarily done 
otherwise, either was, or causally contributed to, E’s occurrence and made 
a difference to whether or not E occurred; and (U) for every X and Y 
(where X and Y represent occurrences of events and/or states) if the agent 
is personally responsible for X, and if Y is an arche (or sufficient ground 
or cause or explanation) for X, then the agent must also be personally 
responsible for Y. (35) 
 
Kane notes that the first subcondition, R, can be given a compatibilist reading with 
conditional analyses of “could” in “could have voluntarily done otherwise.”  Because of 
this, as shown in the last sub-section, R alone is not enough reason to be an 
incompatibilist.  It is in the second, backtracking subcondition, U, where incompatibilism 
is shown to be a necessity.   
Consider Paul, a rampant womanizer, and Joan, his latest victim.  Paul tells Joan 
whatever she would like to hear (lies, of course) in order that he may take her to his bed.  
According to R, we can hold Paul responsible if he could have voluntarily done other 
than what he did.  Given a compatibilist spin, this becomes if he could have voluntarily 
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done other than what he did if he had so chosen to do so.  Kane may not be happy with 
conditional analyses of “could”, but he will not raise a fuss because it is in U where true 
responsibility lies. It is not enough that Paul could have voluntarily done other than what 
he did.  He must also have been responsible for whatever would have allowed him to do 
so.  Under the compatibilist reading of “could”, Paul plays no causal role in his possibly 
doing otherwise, rather, his doing otherwise would result from the past being different or 
the changing of a law of nature.  Neither option is incredibly likely, even given Lewis’ 
weak sense of being able to make a proposition false. 
To simplify, let’s say that there was a single action A in Paul’s past which led him 
to become a rampant womanizer. According to U, Paul is only responsible for his current 
action provided he is also responsible for A.  But it does not seem possible for Paul to be 
responsible for A if determinism holds because A would have a cause, B, of its own which 
Paul must have been responsible for, and B would have cause C, etc., until it regresses to 
a point before Paul existed.  For Kane (under U), the causal chain must stop at a point 
where Paul is still capable of being responsible and is in fact responsible for the stoppage.  
A would then have to be not determined by prior events yet somehow be caused by Paul.  
Kane refers to an action of this type as a self-forming action (SFA) or self-forming 
willing (SFW).   Kane defines an SFA as: 
SFAs are the undetermined, regress-stopping voluntary actions (or 
refrainings) in the life histories of agents that are required if U is to be 
satisfied, and for which the agent is personally responsible in the sense of 
R.  The agents must therefore be responsible for them directly and not by 
virtue of being responsible for other, earlier actions (as would be required 
if they were not regress stopping).  This means that, for SFAs, the 
“something the agents could have voluntarily done (or omitted) that would 
have made a difference in whether or not they occurred” is simply doing 
otherwise, rather than doing something else that would have causally 
contributed to their not occurring. (75) 
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In the case of Paul, action A was an SFA and, because of this, Paul is ultimately 
responsible for both A and the subsequent action of seducing Joan.   
2.1.4. The Significance of Free Will 
 Having established that the type of freedom in question, freedom of the will, is 
not compatible with determinism by UR, Kane turns his attention to providing reasons for 
accepting UR.  To do so, he discusses the concept of sole authorship or underived 
origination.  This concept is considered at one time or another by both compatibilists and 
incompatibilists, to be embraced by the latter and rejected by the former.  This concept 
holds the source of action to be the agent or self and not something outside of the agent.  
The causes of our actions would be traceable back to a SFA of which the agent is the sole 
author and underived originator.  It is this type of free will that ordinary persons believe 
they want when they want free will. 
 This type of freedom has typically been seen to be worth wanting because it is 
necessary for other goods that are generally desired and are worth wanting.  Among these 
other goods are genuine creativity, self-legislation, true desert for one’s achievements, 
dignity, moral responsibility, etc. (80).  Kane describes what he calls the dialectic of 
underived origination or sole authorship which begins with incompatibilists arguing that 
the goods mentioned are not compatible with determinism.  For example, the truth of 
determinism would entail that Starry Night is no more an achievement of Van Gogh than 
it is of me.  The creation of the work was inevitable and there is nothing in the work that 
originated within Van Gogh but rather was caused by events prior to his birth.   
The second step of the dialectic is the compatibilist response.  The compatibilist 
argues that the goods mentioned above are possible without UR.  Even if determinism 
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were true, Starry Night would still be an original work that was not created before Van 
Gogh and was only possible through Van Gogh.  According to the compatibilist, the 
incompatibilist objection is question begging with respect to the falsity of determinism – 
they describe these goods in such a way that they cannot be compatible with 
determinism.  It is, therefore, not surprising that the goods are not available if 
determinism were true.  However, there are other accounts of the goods in question that 
are neutral with respect to the truth of determinism, and it is these the incompatibilist 
must draw from for their argument to hold.  The incompatibilist responds that these other 
accounts do not capture what is worth wanting in creativity and the other goods.  There is 
a more exalted sense in which we want to be able to create.  To this the compatibilists 
respond that the incompatibilist begs the question and an impasse is reached again.  Kane 
recognizes that most free will debates do not get beyond the impasse that results from the 
dialectic of origination.  He argues that we must dig deeper into the conflicting intuitions 
behind the impasse. 
Free will is a metaphysical issue in that it deals with the ultimate source or 
explanation of responsible human actions.  What results from examining the deeper 
metaphysical problem of free will is not the dialectic of origination, but rather what Kane 
calls the “dialectic of selfhood.”  In this dialectic, Kane tells a story of an infant who in 
the midst of interacting with the world learns that she can control certain things in her 
environment, like her hand, and not control others.  She learns that the hand is part of her 
and that she can control it via an act of will.  In this way the infant learns to separate 
herself from the world as an independent causal agent.  As the infant grows older, she 
feels the need for approbation – appreciation and acknowledgement for what she does.  
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Kane suggest that this desire for approbation is part of a fundamental need to affirm her 
selfhood as an independent being that is a source of activity.  It is this more fundamental 
need that serves as the basis of the goods mentioned in the dialectic of origination 
(creativity, autonomy, etc.).12   
The awareness that she is a part of and causally influences the world brings about 
a spiritual crisis.  The crisis takes the form of the worry that just as the world is causally 
influenced by her, so she is in turn causally influenced by the world.  This is the fear that 
she is not separate from the world at all but merely a part of it.  This is the traditional fear 
that we possess no free will but are mere physical beings to whom freedom is but an 
illusion.   
Kane considers two possible reactions to this spiritual crisis.  The first is that she 
insists that she is not part of the physical world at all but rather can still causally act upon 
it.  This is Cartesian dualism and Kane finds this reaction too crude.  The second, a less 
crude reaction than the first, does not place the self completely outside the world.  She is 
part of the world and is influenced by it but she somehow has the final say on which way 
she is influenced.  Kane uses as an analogy the membrane of a cell that allows in that 
which is useful to the cell and keeps out that which is harmful.  In this way the agent can 
imagine herself as a sophisticated being with the selective power to choose how she 
affects and is affected by the world.  Inside her “membrane”, she is able to find refuge 
from the spiritual crisis.13 
 This second reaction can only be a temporary solution for the agent for she will 
surely realize that she is neither completely in control of nor completely aware of all of 
the outside influences.  Here the pervasive threat of determinism comes completely to the 
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fore.  She cannot be sure that the choices that she makes within her “membrane” are not 
determined by her nature and are therefore not in her control.  Kane suggests that we 
view the thread of determinism not as an isolated phenomenon but rather as a stage in the 
dialectic of selfhood.  At each stage of the dialectic, she tries to preserve the idea that she 
is an independent source of activity.  From this stage she is propelled to an expression of 
UR.  A conviction that though many of her choices may be determined, it cannot be so 
for all of her choices.  In this way Kane sees free will as a “higher stage response to the 
dialectic of selfhood” that “emerges as an issue when we realize how profoundly the 
world influences us in ways of which we are unaware” (96).14 
 Kane provides the example of Alan the artist to demonstrate another reason we 
find free will to be significant: objective worth.  Kane asks us to consider two worlds.  In 
both, Alan’s paintings have not found the success that he would have liked.  In the first 
world, a rich friend of Alan’s secretly arranges to buy several of Alan’s works through 
agents acting on his behalf.  In the second world, the purchasers of Alan’s works do so 
because they genuinely find them admirable.  In both worlds, Alan dies happily believing 
that he is successful artist, but it is only actually true in the second world.  Though both 
worlds are subjectively identical for Alan, we do think that there is a reason to choose the 
second world over the first.  For Kane, this reason is that the objective worth of our 
actions does matter.  The fact that we do consider the objective worth important shows 
that we are not merely concerned with how things appear to us (whether it merely 
appears to us that we are free), but rather how things actually are (whether we are 
actually free or not).  If we did not find free will significant then we would not hold 
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things like objective worth important.  The fact that we do shows that we hold free will as 
significant. 
 It is important to note that Kane does not offer the dialectic of selfhood (nor the 
importance of objective worth) as some sort of proof or argument that freedom is not 
compatible with determinism.  He has already established that the freedom he is 
concerned with, freedom of the will, is not compatible with determinism via his 
discussions surrounding UR.  What he is attempting here is to show both that this 
freedom is significant and show why it is deemed so.  This is the role of the dialectic of 
selfhood.  Freedom of the will may turn out to be something unintelligible, but whatever 
it is it will be something that agents desire and hold as important. 
 Having established that free will is significant, Kane next attempts to develop a 
conception of free will that is intelligible. 
2.2. Intelligibility and Existence 
In this section I discuss Kane’s response to the intelligibility and existence 
questions.  He attempts to answer the former by appealing to plural rationality and 
indeterminate efforts of will.  The latter he answers by utilizing quantum indeterminacy, 
chaos theory, and folk psychology. 
2.2.1. The Free Agency Principle 
Traditional compatibilist attacks against libertarians have focused on the 
unintelligibility of their position – the mysteriousness that goes with the emptiness of 
accepting the second horn of the libertarian dilemma by positing accounts of libertarian 
agency that cannot be adequately explained.  Kane hopes to make libertarianism at least 
on par with compatibilism by not allowing the libertarian to call on any special entities or 
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special forms of causation to explain free will.  Kane only allows one tool that the 
compatibilist is not allowed to utilize – indeterminism.15  To do so, Kane formulizes “The 
Free Agency Principle” (FAP).  Under this principle, the incompatibilist is allowed “that 
some of the events or processes in libertarian free agency will be indeterminate or 
undetermined events or processes”.  However, these events or processes cannot be explained 
by an appeal to “categories or kinds of entities that are not also needed by non-libertarian 
(compatibilist or determinist) accounts of free agency” (116).  Out go Kantian noumenal 
selves, Cartesian Egos, and special types of agent causation.  These libertarian strategies had 
their hearts in the right place but must be set aside in order for the incompatibilist position to 
put itself on the same ground as compatibilists with regards to their relation to modern 
science.  If Kane can perform such a task, he will have struck a marked blow for libertarian 
philosophy.  He attempts to do so by appealing to plural rationality, quantum indeterminacy, 
chaos theory, and folk psychology.  
2.2.2. Plural Rationality – The Divided Will 
 A compatibilist criticism against the use of indeterminism to explain free will is one-
way rationality.  Suppose Lance ventures to a sporting goods store to purchase a mountain 
bicycle so that he can bike along several forest trails while on vacation.  When he arrives, he 
notices that there are two types of bikes available: mountain bikes and street bikes.  Once 
there, Lance can choose to purchase a mountain bike or he could choose to purchase a street 
bike.  The street bike, with its skinny tires and low durability wouldn’t suit Lance’s purposes 
at all.  Which type of bike will Lance actually purchase?  From the rational point of view, he 
really has only one choice – the mountain bike.  The decision to purchase the mountain bike 
would be a rational decision, the only rational decision available.  If Lance’s choice was 
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indeterminate and resulted in the purchase of the street bike, we could consider his purchase 
foolhardy and irrational.  This is what is meant by one-way rationality.  When faced with a 
choice, only one option is the most rational one and, hence, is the only rational option to 
choose.  Any other choice would be at the very least less rational than it. 
Kane argues that libertarians must give up one-way rationality if they hope to 
achieve an account of indeterministic freedom and agency that is intelligible.  This is so 
because the libertarian must make allowances for the ability to have done otherwise.  This 
ability amounts to very little if it is only the ability to act irrationally.  Because of this, 
libertarians should accept plural rationality.  Under Kane’s account, Lance’s decision to buy 
the street bike would never occur because Lance has no reason to buy the street bike.  As we 
shall see later, the conflict needed for the indeterminacy to arise does not occur.  A more apt 
example would be one of Greg who also wishes to buy a bike and must choose between a 
mountain bike and a street bike.  Like Lance, Greg also wishes to ride along forest trails.  
Unlike Lance, Greg also desires (say, to a lesser extent) to race against other street bike 
riders in a race.  In this example, it would be rational for Greg to choose the mountain bike 
because it is what he most wants to do.  However, Greg does have a desire (and, hence, a 
reason) to purchase a street bike.  If he goes home with a street bike, it will not be an 
irrational decision because, unlike Lance, Greg had reasons for purchasing the street bike.  
In a case like this the will is best thought of as divided.  Before the decision is actually 
made, Greg’s divided will supports the selection of either bike. 
Kane has similar arguments in favor of plural accounts of voluntariness and 
control.  Given the setup of the example, it would seem odd to say that had Lance chosen 
to purchase the street bike he would have done so voluntarily and it would have been a 
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choice of which he was in control.  We wouldn’t say that because he doesn’t have any 
desire to purchase the street bike.  The case of Greg is different and provides an example 
of plural voluntariness and plural control.  Because he has reasons for choosing either 
bike, either resulting choice would be voluntary and in Greg’s control.  This will be 
discussed more later.  Now I turn my attention to the role that indeterminacy and chaos 
theory play in Kane’s account of agency. 
2.2.3. Indeterminacy and Chaos Theory 
 Though universal determinism has been in retreat in the physical sciences due to the 
advance of quantum physics, it has not led to an increase in indeterministic theories of 
freedom.  This can be explained because of trends within sciences other than physics, most 
notably biology and the social sciences, which have convinced many that more and more of 
our behavior is determined by causes that are not known to us and beyond our control.  
Additionally, indeterminacy at the micro level does not seem to have any obvious 
indeterminate effect on the macro level, which include larger physical systems such as the 
human brain and body.  Compatibilists have taken this line and further argued that even if 
indeterminacy were to have macro effects it would not help the indeterminist’s position.  
Action that is indetermined is not action but simple motion for which an agent cannot be 
held responsible.  In appealing to quantum indeterminacy, Kane must give both an 
explanation for how micro indeterminacy can cause macro indeterminacy and explain how it 
results in an action for which the agent can be held responsible.  Kane explains the latter via 
a materialistic view of the self and folk psychology (which I go into in the next sub-section) 
and explains the former via chaos theory. 
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 Chaos theory involves the notion of sensitivity to initial conditions.  Very minute 
changes in the initial conditions grow exponentially and result in very large differences in 
the final outcome.  The apparently insignificant fluttering of a butterfly’s wings in China, for 
example, can via chaotic effects result in rain falling on Central Park.  Similarly, the 
seemingly negligible indeterminacies at the quantum level can, via the perturbation 
amplification of a chaotic system, result in indeterminacy at the macro level.  Kane cites 
current work in neurophysiology that indicates that neural networks can express chaotic 
effects.  I now turn to showing what role indeterminism plays in an agent’s decision making 
process. 
 For Kane, the opportunity to perform a “self-forming action” or a “self-forming 
willing” for which the agent is ultimately responsible occurs when a divided will arrives at a 
choice that must be made among non-compossible alternatives.  A typical example is an 
agent whose will is divided between following a moral course of action and prudential 
course of action but cannot do both.  A shopkeeper must decide whether or not to 
overcharge her customers.  If she does, she will (conceivably) earn more.  However, if she 
does overcharge she will have acted immorally – against her own morality.  Every agent 
possesses this sort of divided will to some extent that results in two competing desires, the 
desire to be prudent and the desire to act morally.  The shopkeeper, like most of us, would 
rather be moral but it takes some amount of effort of will to resist the desire to act self-
interestedly.  In such situations of conflict, what the shopkeeper will do is uncertain – even 
to the shopkeeper.  This is because in cases of struggle between a divided will she cannot 
know before hand which side will win out.  It is in this uncertainty that Kane places the 
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indeterminism and “(t)he uncertainty and inner tension that agents feel at such moments are 
reflected in the indeterminacy of their neural processes” (130).  
After the choice is made, she will (because of plural rationality) be able to look 
backwards and provide reasons for making that choice (prudential reasons on the one hand, 
moral reasons on the other).  However, what has actually happened is that anxiety over non-
compossible choices has had a chaotic effect in her on activity on the quantum level.  This 
results in the opening of a window of indeterminacy at the macro level that enabled her to 
make a “self-forming action” or “self-forming willing” for which she is responsible.  The 
complex process involved in the indeterminacy is felt phenomenologically as an effort of 
her will.  Or, rather, the indeterminate process in the brain is a physical realization of her 
effort of will. 
 To further explain how the action is an action for which the shopkeeper can be held 
responsible, I need to discuss Kane’s materialistic view of the self.  He equates the self with 
a self-network that is a neural net.  He follows Owen Flanagan by considering the self as a 
model contained in the brain.  It is this model (which plans, aspires, etc.) that Kane identifies 
as the self-network.  He argues that the unity of the self-network can be found “in the 
dynamical properties of neural circuits and connections that make such synchronous patterns 
of neural firings possible” (140).  The neural events that correspond to our efforts and 
choices are, in this theory of agency, overlaid by wave patterns which unify the self-
network, “so that the wave patterns and the effort or choice events are coupled, causally 
influencing and interacting with each other” (ibid.).  These “superimposed patterns of 
oscillations” would be contributing causes to choice by pushing one competing “reason-
network” to the forefront.  In the case of the shopkeeper, one reason-network would support 
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charging fair prices and another would support overcharging.  The choice ultimately made is 
indeterminate in a sense (because the effort of will is influenced by quantum indeterminacy) 
yet it is still a choice made by the agent for which the agent, according to Kane, can be held 
responsible.  This further explains how character is formed according to Kane.  The 
indeterminate process results in a decision that in turn affects the state of the self-network.  
In the case of Martin Luther, his earlier actions in life helped form his self-network such that 
his later decision was determined.  
 Indeterminacy acts to maintain the ultimate responsibility of the agent by breaking 
the causal chain (that results in an action) within the agent herself.  We cannot defer to 
conditions that held before the shopkeeper existed to explain why she acted morally rather 
than immorally, the causal chain of explanation ends inside the agent via her indeterministic 
effort of will.  Her action can be explained (by either moral or self-interested reasons), but 
the cause of the resulting action is ultimately the agent.  In this way, Kane satisfies condition 
UR. 
2.2.4. Folk Psychology 
 From a purely physical point of view, it is hard to accept that it is the shopkeeper 
that does anything.  Kane notes as much by stating that “when neuroscientists described it 
(her action) in physico-chemical terms, all they would get are indeterministic chaotic 
processes with probabilistic outcomes” (147).  However, Kane argues, the scientific 
perspective is not the only perspective from which to assess an agent’s action.  There is also 
what Kane refers to as the phenomenological perspective from which, experientially 
considered, the physical process is the agent’s choice.  For this reason, Kane argues that one 
can’t be an eliminative materialist with regard to human action - it is in virtue of the folk 
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psychological descriptions that we are able to ascertain that we are free.  The physical 
description cannot be the only description available.  To do so would be to write free will 
out of the world picture along with other valued things such as consciousness, purpose, and 
mental action in general (ibid.). 
 It seems counterintuitive for us to believe that consciousness is a physical process, 
but this is a problem that Kane argues is shared by any (materialist) account of free agency, 
compatibilist or incompatibilist.  “It is no less mysterious how neural firings in the brain 
could be conscious mental events if they are determined than if they are undetermined, or if 
they involved undetermined chaotic processes than if they do not” (148). 
 Indeterminism and folk psychology play vital roles in Kane’s theory.  Without 
indeterminism, an agent cannot be ultimately responsible for her action.  Without folk 
psychology, his materialist conception of the self and human action would not allow that the 
undetermined choice was something the agent did as opposed to something that merely 
happened.  
2.3.  Criticisms 
 Kane has done an admirable job of creating a libertarian account of free will that is 
at the very least an improvement over traditional libertarian accounts of agency that are 
eliminated by the Free Agency Principle.  However, all is not well in his libertarian paradise.  
In this section, I outline several objections to Kane’s libertarian philosophy.  The first sub-
section will contain criticisms of Kane’s argument for the significance of libertarian free 
will.  The second sub-section contains criticisms of his use of indeterminacy to gain freedom 
of the will.  
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2.3.1. Significance 
 The first set of criticisms concern Kane’s attempt to answer the significance question 
via the dialectic of selfhood.  Recall that Kane considers the worry of determinism (and 
hence any compatibilist position) merely a stage in the dialectic of selfhood, one that is 
surpassed by the higher stage of becoming a believer in freedom of the will.  Kane has not 
provided sufficient justification for his ordering of the stages in this manner.  His chosen 
stopping point, the stage of free will, is arbitrary.  His suggestion is that it is common for 
agents, through the course of their lives, to engage in the dialectic.  If this is so, surely then 
some of those who engage in the dialectic of selfhood are the very compatibilist 
philosophers against whom Kane is arguing.   
 But then Kane would have to provide a plausible explanation for what went wrong 
in their case, an explanation that maintains the supremacy of his final stage.  Arguing that 
the compatibilists are stuck on a lower stage would not work.  By virtue of what is the 
Kane’s free will stage higher than the compatibilist stage?  The compatibilists could even 
admit that Kane’s dialectic is well formed but incomplete, lacking an even higher stage at 
which point the agent becomes disillusioned with libertarian freedom because of, say, its 
unintelligibility, and reaches a still higher stage of compatibilism.  Perhaps compatibilism 
does not even come into the picture at the earlier stage that is dominated by the threat of 
determinism but rather only arises after the agent becomes dissatisfied with libertarian free 
will.  Kane’s story can thus be read as a just so story.16  It is manufactured to back up 
Kane’s philosophy and certainly sounds plausible but there are alternative stories which 
match the evidence yet do not go hand in hand with his theory, especially concerning 
where Kane chooses to end his dialectic.   
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 Also problematic is Kane’s use of the example of Alan the artist.  Recall that in 
the example Alan believes himself to be a respected artist in two different worlds, but he 
is mistaken about this in the first world and correct about it in the second.  If given a 
choice, Alan would choose to live in the second world (and if we were in Alan’s shoes, 
we’d choose the same).  Kane uses this to show that subjective worth is not all that 
matters to us.  We want our subjective experiences to match with objective reality.  It is 
not enough that Alan believe that he is a successful artist, he must objectively be a 
successful artist.   
 Analogously, if we were given the choice of living in one of two worlds, the first 
a determined one (Compatibilist World, or CW) and the second a world in which 
libertarian free will functions (Libertarian World, or LW), we would choose the second 
world.  Because we would choose the second world over the first, Kane argues, we 
consider freedom of the will something significant and worth wanting.  I argue that 
compatibilists can readily admit that they would prefer to live in the libertarian world 
without admitting that libertarian free will is significant.  Imagine a third world to 
compete with CW and LW.  In this third world, in addition to having libertarian free will 
we also possess the freedom to defy the law of gravity.  I’ll call this world Flying 
Libertarian World, or FLW.  If asked to choose among CW, LW and FLW, surely both 
compatibilists and incompatibilists would choose to live in FLW (the non-acrophobic 
ones at any rate).   Consider a fourth world that is identical to CW except that we have 
the ability of flight as in FLW (call this one CFW).  If asked to choose between CFW and 
LW, there is no guarantee that LW would be chosen more often.  Suppose CFW is 
preferable (if flying is not attractive enough, I can create other compatibilist worlds – 
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worlds where the past can be altered, worlds where we are all gods, etc. – complicated 
worlds and even, pardon the phrase, possibly impossible ones at that).  By Kane’s 
reasoning, that would indicate that freedom to fly is a significant freedom and one worth 
wanting, a freedom even more significant than libertarian freedom.  My point here is not 
to show that the freedom to break the law of gravity is more significant than libertarian 
free will.  I only hope to show that the process Kane uses to determine whether a freedom 
is significant or not is unreliable.  This is so because the process that he employs will 
allow for unintelligible freedoms or freedoms irrelevant to the problem of free will to 
become significant freedoms.  This problem can more clearly be seen when we consider 
the connection between the questions of significance and intelligibility. 
 One final criticism also centers on Kane’s criteria for significant freedoms.  Using 
Kane’s criteria the compatibilist would no doubt find libertarian free will significant.  
However, for compatibilists the question of significance is closely tied with the intelligibility 
of freedom at hand in a way that Kane has not accounted for. What matters most for the 
question of significance is whether the freedom in question could conceivably exist.  Kane’s 
argument for significance, if it works, will only do so provided he can defend an account of 
libertarian free will that is intelligible.  Until he does so, LW doesn’t become available as an 
option for choice.  I now turn to criticisms that indicate that he has not succeeded in doing 
so. 
2.3.2. Indeterminism and Folk Psychology 
 In this sub-section, I launch two main criticisms against Kane's use of indeterminacy 
to gain freedom of the will.  The first concerns the problem of moral luck and Kane’s 
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response to it.  The second concerns the role folk psychology plays in Kane’s libertarian 
philosophy and is developed into the form of a dilemma for Kane. 
 The problem of moral luck is especially relevant to Kane’s libertarianism.17  This 
can been seen more easily in light of the self-forming actions or willings (again, SFAs and 
SFWs).  An SFW results not only in an action for which the agent can be held responsible, 
but also serves to shape an agent’s character such that he will be more likely to act in a 
similar manner in the future.  Consider John, a college student who is considering cheating 
on a chemistry exam because he has not studied properly.  John must choose to either act 
morally and fail the exam, or act (arguably) prudentially and cheat on the exam to avoid the 
consequences of failing.  Further suppose that John’s character up to this point could be 
numerically measured and represented as a ratio representing the strength of his desire to 
perform either action on a scale of 100.  In this case, John’s character can be represented as 
the ratio 55:45, with the larger number designating the stronger desire.18  In this case, the 
stronger desire is to cheat (55) and the weaker to act morally (45).  Given that the two 
alternatives are non-compossible, John agonizes sufficiently enough that he is able to 
perform an SFA. 
 Usually agents strive against prudential choices in favor of moral ones, but not in 
this case.  John actually desires to cheat more and, if he does not end up cheating, it will be 
because his effort to decide to cheat (his effort of will) failed as a result of the indeterminate 
process that Kane describes.  John’s SFA results in the moral choice.  This result also has an 
effect on John’s character such that he is more likely to perform moral actions in the future 
(Kane argues that the resulting choice in an SFA in turn affects the organization of the self-
network in this manner).   
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 Though he did not cheat, John managed to avoid failing (the exam was not as 
difficult as he feared).  However, he has not learned his lesson.  The very next week he has a 
Continental Philosophy exam that he has not studied for.  Again, he is faced with the same 
choice – be moral and fail or be prudential and cheat.  His previous choice has affected him 
in such a manner that he stills prefers to cheat over failing, but instead of favoring it in a 
ratio of 55/45 it is now 51/49.   
 Again imagine that the SFA results in moral choice that changes his character such 
that if he were to be placed in a similar situation again he would now desire to be moral 
more than to cheat by a ratio of 51/49 (51 representing the moral desire, 49 the desire to 
cheat).  This scenario can be played out again and again, each time resulting in John making 
the moral choice and increasing his future chances of making more moral choices.  At some 
point, John’s character will be such that he will not be faced with a dilemma when placed in 
a similar situation.  His act moral/cheat ratio would (conceivably) be 100:0.  Because he no 
longer desires to cheat, he will no longer face the anxiety that results in the indeterminate 
SFA.  These events have occurred in possible world number one (PW1 – the John in PW1 
will now be referred to as John1). 
 Now, consider possible world number two (PW2) that is identical to PW1 up to the 
point where the first SFA occurs in the previous example.  The John in PW2, call him 
John2, faces the same dilemma with the exact same character makeup.  However, the 
indeterminate SFA ends with the choice to cheat instead of act morally.  This SFA results in 
a change in John2’s character ratio such that he will now favor cheating by a ratio of 60/40.  
Just like John1, John2 faces similar dilemmas in the future and each time happens to choose 
against acting morally until his character ratio is 100:0 in favor of cheating.  At this point, 
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again, there is no dilemma.  His character would determine that he cheat in similar 
situations. 
 John1 in PW1 has become a better, more moral person than John2 in PW2.  But to 
what does John1 owe his good character?  It is hard to see why we should praise John1 for 
not cheating and blame John2 for cheating when the only difference between them was that 
John1 was lucky enough to have SFA’s that resulted in moral actions and John2 was not.  
The difference is that John2 had a successful effort of will and John1 did not (recall that 
each John originally possessed a stronger desire to perform the immoral act – it was John1’s 
failure to perform the action he most desired that led to the moral action). 
 According to Kane, the effort of will is an indeterminate process.  But because of 
this we can neither praise an agent for having a successful effort of will when trying to act 
morally nor can we blame an agent who fails such an attempt because he did not try hard 
enough.  Whether he tried hard enough or not was simply not up to the agent – it was 
indetermined. 
 Kane addresses a similar criticism in chapter 10 as made by Bruce Waller.19  He 
responds in two ways.  First, he argues that though the effort of will is indeterminate, 
whether or not it is successful is not a matter of luck.  Rather, whatever the result of the 
effort, the choice will be one that the agent voluntarily made.  This is so both because he has 
reasons for performing either option and because he is responsible (via previous SFAs) for 
the limited options available to him.  The indeterminate process will not result in the agent 
performing some wildly unpredictable action such as screaming gibberish and performing 
cartwheels.  John’s wrestling over cheating or not will have one of only two consequences – 
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he will cheat or he will not cheat.  Since he is responsible for those being the only two 
options, it is not a matter of luck which option he settles on. 
 This response fails to address the criticism directly.  In the case of John1 and John2, 
at the time the agents had identical makeup, Kane’s answer does not yet give us any reason 
to consider that John1’s resulting good character and John2’s resulting bad character were 
not the result of moral luck.  Though it might not be pure luck and only luck that decides it, 
there cannot be a doubt that fortune plays a hand. 
 The second response to this objection by Kane is to argue that the example is flawed 
because it assumes that the pasts of the two agents, John1 and John2, are exactly the same.  
This is because exact sameness is not defined with indeterminate efforts.  As Kane states 
rather strongly: 
If the efforts are indeterminate, one cannot say the efforts had exactly the 
same strength, or that one was exactly greater or less great than the other.  
That is what indeterminacy amounts to.  So one cannot say of two agents 
that they had exactly the same pasts and made exactly the same efforts and 
one got lucky while the other did not.  Nor can one imagine the same agent 
in two possible worlds with exactly the same pasts making exactly the same 
effort and getting lucky in one world and not the other.  Exact sameness (or 
difference) of possible worlds is not defined if the possible worlds contain 
indeterminate events of any kinds.  And there would be no such thing as two 
agents having exactly the same life histories if their life histories contain 
indeterminate efforts or free choices. (171-2) 
 
I find this statement puzzling.  Unless I am grossly mistaken about how possible worlds 
operate, I can indeed imagine “the same agent in two possible worlds with the exact same 
pasts making exactly the same effort…”  I believe I have just imagined it in the John1/John2 
thought experiment.20  It may be the case that I cannot explore the intricacies of John’s brain 
and the quantum events that occur there, record them, and have them duplicated in the form 
of John2.  That may forever be beyond us, but that is hardly required in this case.  Whatever 
the results of an agent’s mental processes, possible worlds can work in such a way that there 
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will always be another possible world that is identical with the agent’s world such that even 
the indeterminate processes just so happen to have the same results.  To simply state that this 
is not possible is not an adequate response to the objection. 
 I now move on to the second criticism of this sub-section.  Indeterminism in Kane’s 
theory serves the role of allowing for an agent to be ultimately responsible for her action.  It 
is not clear why, however, Kane’s placement of indeterminacy within the agent serves to 
make his theory exempt from traditional objections against indeterminism.  Additionally, 
Kane would be hard pressed to show that indeterminism plays any role in explaining the 
freedom of the agent.   
 Consider a pair of magic dice.  When rolled their outcome is indeterminate in the 
sense that even an omniscient being (who would be presumably informed of all the relevant 
facts and laws for the purpose of prediction) would not be able to predict which numbers 
will land facing up.  If God does indeed play dice with the universe, these are the dice he 
would employ.  The shopkeeper is faced with a dilemma – to overcharge or not.  Which 
action the shopkeeper performs will be the result of an indeterminate effort of her will – an 
effort that can be represented by a toss of the magic dice. Kane has not shown that his theory 
gains anything by making the indeterminacy internal to the agent.  Such placement of 
indeterminacy is an attempt to show that the agent has ultimate responsibility for her actions.  
However, what difference does it make if the magic dice belong to the agent or not?  
Regardless of to whom they belong the result of the throw will be equally indetermined and, 
because it is indetermined, not a result for which the agent can be held ultimately 
responsible.  Whatever results would not be an action attributable to the agent, but rather a 
movement that just happened as a result of an indeterministic process.  Whatever role 
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indeterminism plays in Kane’s theory, it alone does not play the role of obtaining freedom 
for agents.  For that, he must also look to folk psychological ascription and the 
phenomenological perspective. 
 The freedom described in Kane’s theory is not gained solely via indeterminism and 
ultimate responsibility, but rather additionally through the claim folk psychology cannot be 
discarded.  To discard folk psychology is to take something akin to the scientific perspective 
described by Kane.  From this perspective, it is hard to attribute freedom to actions.  Instead 
of actions performed by agents, there are only descriptions of movements of physical 
objects.   It is only by virtue of describing certain movements in a certain way, namely, by 
describing the actions of agents from the phenomenological perspective, that freedom could 
possibly arise.  Why did the shopkeeper charge fair prices for her products?  It is the 
phenomenological perspective, that which employs folk psychological descriptions and 
ascription, which provides an acceptable answer: she did so because she had decided to be 
moral in the instance in question.21  
 Kane’s dependence upon folk psychology is problematic because folk psychology is 
compatible with determinism.  We can be determined in such a way that we attribute 
freedom to one another via folk psychological ascription.  Kane’s use of folk psychology 
strengthens the weakest part of compatibilist theories that have been criticized for being 
unable to account for how a determined motion can count as an action for which an agent 
can be held responsible. Using folk psychology does indeed make Kane’s theory more 
plausible (from the point of view of the compatibilist, anyway) than those libertarian 
theories that are excluded by the free agency principle, but at the cost of bolstering 
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compatibilist intuitions and losing the ammunition that has traditionally been used against 
the compatibilist position.  
 Kane considers an objection in the eighth chapter of his book similar to what is 
made here (148).  A hypothetical compatibilist complains that Kane is merely replacing one 
mystery – that of agent-causes, noumenal selves, or mind/body dualism – for another 
mystery – this time of indeterministic efforts of will described physically as indeterminate 
processes that are happening in the brain but phenomenologically as something that agents 
are doing.  Kane agrees that this is so but notes that the second mystery is part of a larger 
problem of consciousness that, unlike the first mystery, is acceptable because Kane shares 
this mystery with compatibilists. 
 However, materialistic accounts of freedom (indeterministic or deterministic) that 
rely on folk psychology are in the same boat when it comes to the possibility of discovering 
the truth or falsity of determinism.  Suppose it is discovered that determinism is false.  Then 
compatibilist accounts can be slightly adjusted to take into account Kane’s brand of 
indeterminacy.  Alternately, suppose that determinism is  somehow  discovered to be true.  
Then incompatibilist accounts such as Kane’s can be slightly adjusted.22  The important 
point is that regardless of whether determinism is actually true or actually false, folk 
psychology can still be used because it is compatible with either alternative.  Because of 
this, it cannot play the role of securing indeterministic freedom.  Kane has espoused a 
position that is not primarily on the side of libertarians against compatibilists and hard 
determinists, but rather on the side of free materialists (whether compatibilists or 
incompatibilists) against libertarians and hard determinists. 
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 A defender of Kane might respond that my objection has missed the point.  There is 
a great difference between Kane and compatibilist accounts of freedom that rely upon folk 
psychology.  This difference is the AP condition (or could have done otherwise).  Whereas 
the compatibilist must give up a condition such as AP (taken in the libertarian sense, of 
course), Kane is able to employ it in such a way that allows for moral responsibility.  This 
defender might say that quantum indeterminacy and folk psychology play vital but different 
roles in Kane’s account.  We have, via quantum indeterminacy, that things could have 
happened differently.  What makes that happening into a doing, however, is folk psychology 
(and hence, we cannot be eliminative materialists).  My response to this defender takes the 
form of a dilemma pertaining to what Kane means by folk psychology. 
 Consider two senses of folk psychology.  The first sense is the simple idea expressed 
in the computational theory of mind that our beliefs and desires combine to determine 
actions.  I refer to this as weak folk psychology (or WFP).  The second sense is a much 
stronger sense that Kane seems to be getting at (I refer to it as SFP).  The stronger version 
holds that there is an irreducible phenomenological component to our actions that we must 
take very seriously and serves to allow for moral responsibility.  But does Kane appeal to 
WFP plus quantum indeterminacy or SFP plus quantum indeterminacy?  Here the dilemma 
arises.   
 If he is appealing to WFP, then his account amounts to a version of the 
computational theory of mind attached to a random number generator (via quantum 
indeterminacy).  This may give us a sense of being able to do otherwise, but it does not seem 
to be a sense that the libertarian would think is relevant to questions of moral responsibility.   
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 If he is appealing to SFP, then I question whether quantum indeterminacy plays any 
necessary role in the equation.  If SFP is enough to make an action a doing in a morally 
relevant sense for Kane, it should be enough to make an action a doing in a morally relevant 
sense for compatibilists.   
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter I have explained the indeterminist incompatibilist philosophy of 
Kane.  In doing so, I have raised several objections specific to his account.  Specifically, 
with is argument supporting the idea that the traditional sense of free will represents a 
significant freedom and with his attempt to provide an intelligible account of such freedom.  
In the next chapter, I discuss objections that pertain to indeterministic accounts of freedom 
in general.  In doing so I discuss, when appropriate, how the objections relate specifically to 
the Kane’s philosophy.   
2.5 End Notes 
 
1 Both Hobbes’ and Bramhall’s positions are outlined in Molesworth (1962). 
 
2 This is a challenge that Kane must answer, and he attempts to do so by trying to remove 
the confusion from the first horn of the dilemma and claiming that other libertarians are 
mistaken in trying to provide an answer to the second horn. 
 
3 Of course, we may also be held responsible for actions that we refrain from performing. 
 
4 The Martin Luther example is found in chapter six of Dennett (1984); the Black and 
Jones example is found in Frankfurt (1969), 835.  
 
5 Dworkin (1986), 424. 
 
6 van Inwagen (1983), 16, quoted in Kane (1998), 45.  
 
7 “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” in Lewis (1986), Vol 2: 291-8. 
 
8 Lewis, 297, quoted in Kane (1998), 49. 
 
 
   




10 This is so because we can imagine the laws of nature being different in such a way that 
they caused the individual to be radically different or caused her not to exist.  
 
11 The respective positions of Austin and Chisholm discussed here can be found in papers 
included in Berofsky (1966).  They are Austin’s “Ifs and Cans” (295-321) and 
Chisholm’s “J. L. Austin’s Philosophical Papers” (339-45). 
 
12 I argue in section 2.3.2 that the compatibilists can accommodate the data used by Kane 
in his dialectic of selfhood. 
 
13 I do not immediately see that the membrane metaphor succeeds.  What materials the 
membrane of a cell allows in and out would be determined by the physical nature of the 
membrane so it does not seem to parallel an active choice made by an agent.  However, it 
is just this type of worry, the worry that (say) her “membrane” is determined by forces 
outside of her control, that Kane argues leads the agent to the next part of the dialectic of 
self-hood. 
 
14 I argue in section 2.3.1 that this stopping point, placing free will as a higher state 
response to the dialectic of selfhood, is arbitrary. 
 
15 What Kane is minimally doing here is not allowing the libertarian to take the second 
horn of the libertarian dilemma.  By doing so, does he take the first horn?  Does he 
dissolve the dilemma? 
 
16 I first encountered the notion of a “just so story” in Daniel Dennett’s Elbow Room 
(1984).  I have since learned that Rudyard Kipling has written a series of “Just So 
Stories” for children that provide humorous answers to such questions as “How the 
Camel Got Its Hump” and “How the Leopard Got Its Spots.”  Additionally, in the 
biological sciences evolutionary explanations for behavior are criticized as being “just so 
stories.”  A most notable example of someone who lodges this type of criticism can be 
found in the work of the renowned zoologist Stephen Jay Gould.  
 
17 The problem of moral luck is discussed in Nagel (1979), 24-38. 
 
18 In reality this may never be so simple – there may always be other options available no 
matter how little the agent desires them.  In this case, perhaps John as an additional 
minute desire to drop out of school and form a rock band.  I have chosen to limit the 
options to two in order to make the example clearer. 
 
19 Waller (1988).  Kane credits the following who have made a similar criticism: Thomas 
Talbot and Richard Double in correspondence; Mark Bernstein and David Blumfeld in 
discussion; and Galen Strawson in Strawson (1994), 19. 
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20 The two Johns were identical until the first SFA mentioned in the example.  They have 
had SFA’s in the past, an equal number of them as a matter of fact, and each of them up 
until this point has had identical results.  I can further imagine another individual who is 
identical to John1 and will be until they both die.    What distinguishes the world of 
John1 from this other world could be an event that occurs in the future after both John’s 
are dead.  It is not necessary to offer an explanation for how John1 and John2 managed to 
be identical until the point at which they split (the first SFA in the example), it is enough 
to state that John1’s history, whatever it may contain, determinate or indeterminate, can 
be cut and pasted, if you will, into another possible world. 
 
21 This is, of course, overly simplistic.  The explanation would have to regress further – 
why did she decide to be moral in this instance?  This latter question is problematic both 
for Kane and for compatibilists – for Kane because the introduction of indeterminism 
makes it more difficult to believe that the action resulted from a decision made by the 
agent; for the compatibilist because the explanation would eventually regress until a point 
of time before the agent was born, in which case how can he be held responsible?  It is 
my contention that folk psychology plays a role in either case to attribute freedom. 
 
22 Kane’s indeterminism could also function as a compatibilist position.  For the 
compatibilist account, imagine the magic dice referred to earlier as only random with 
respect to human beings.  The result of the throw would thus be determined and 
predictable (to God), but appear indeterminate to human beings. 
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3. Four Problems for Indeterministic  
Accounts of Freedom 
 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed the libertarian philosophy of Robert 
Kane.  While doing so, I touched upon the debate between compatibilist and 
indeterminist accounts of freedom.  This chapter is divided into four main sections with 
each section corresponding to four objections to indeterminist accounts of freedom.  In 
the first section, I discuss an objection taken from Galen Strawson that I have labeled 
“Strawson’s Challenge.”  In the second section, I outline an objection raised by Thomas 
Nagel that he has dubbed the “Problem of Autonomy”.  In the third main section, I 
discuss a strategy of Daniel Dennett’s that I refer to as the “Compatibilist Shift” with 
which compatibilists can develop theories of freedom and free agency that are as rich as 
those of the libertarians.  In the final main section, I discuss Richard Double’s objection 
to libertarian accounts of agency, most notably those of Peter van Inwagen and Kane, 
which I refer to as the “Objection From Rational Explanation.”  Additionally, I discuss 
how Kane is either susceptible to the objections or how he might respond to each of them 
where it is appropriate. 
3.1. The Strawson Challenge – No Place for Indeterminacy 
In “Libertarianism, Action, and Self-Determination”,1 Galen Strawson considers 
whether libertarians can answer the skeptical objection that freedom is impossible 
regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism.  If determinism is true, the objection 
holds,  then  our  actions  cannot  be  free  because they are determined.  If determinism is  
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false, our actions cannot be free because they result from a random process that defies 
complete explanation via the previous reason state of the agent.  This is so because of the 
nature of self-determination that is necessary for freedom. 
 To illustrate, Strawson considers three versions of self-determinism.  The first 
type of self-determinism considers an action as self-determined if it is a result of one’s 
own choices, decisions, or deliberations.  This statement of self-determination is 
compatible with determinism.  One’s deliberation and the outcome of the deliberation can 
be determined, but the deliberation must be performed by, and as such belong to, the 
agent who performs the action.  Janice is offered a marijuana cigarette by a college 
roommate and must decide whether or not to accept it.  Throughout her life she has met 
many people who smoke marijuana and has been disgusted by their apathetic attitude.  
However, she is genetically predisposed to be a risk taker and this results in her having a 
desire to experiment with the drug.  She deliberates and her disgust is greater than her 
desire to take the risk.  She decides not to accept the marijuana.  In this example, Janice’s 
action is the result of deliberation, but the result of the deliberation was determined by 
factors not necessarily under Janice’s control.  Though deliberation did take place, 
whichever desire was stronger is the desire that eventually won out.  Because her disgust 
of drug users was greater than her desire to experiment, she could not but refuse the drug.  
Had the risk taking desire been stronger than her disgust, her deliberation would have 
ended by accepting the offered cigarette.  Her action is a self-determining one, in this 
sense, because it is the result of her own deliberation even though the result of the 
deliberation is determined.   
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The second version, which Strawson attributes to the libertarian, is one of true 
self-determination.  According to this version, “one is truly self-determining, in one’s 
actions, only if one is truly self-determined, and one is truly self-determined if and only if 
one has somehow determined how one is in such a way that one is truly responsible for 
how one is” (14).   This type of self-determination can be demonstrated by slightly 
altering the example of Janice.  In this case, Janice would be somehow responsible for 
her two opposing inclinations.  By earlier actions for which she is responsible, she has 
become disgusted with marijuana users and developed an inclination to take risks.  
Again, whichever side is stronger will win out in the deliberation, but the action will be 
self-determining, in this sense, because Janice is somehow responsible for possessing the 
opposing desires and also responsible for their respective strengths.2 
The third version of self-determination allows that one can be truly self-
determining even if one is not responsible for how one is via some type of special 
intervention on the part of the agent.  Regardless of whether or not Janice is responsible 
for her opposing desires and regardless of which desire is stronger, Janice is somehow 
able to intervene in the causal process resulting in an action that is not determined by 
previous events.   
 Both compatibilists and incompatibilists agree that the second type of self-
determination is excluded by determinism.  If I am caused to act because of 
circumstances antecedent to my birth, as determinism entails, then it cannot be true that I 
can be truly self-determined in this sense.  At best, I can have self-determination only of 
the first type.  This type of self-determination is rejected by the libertarian as not being 
self-determination at all.  The skeptical question that remains to be answered is whether 
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true self-determination is possible if determinism is false.  To be taken seriously as a 
libertarian, Strawson argues, it is not enough to simply renounce determinism and 
introduce indeterminism.  The libertarian philosopher must also give an account of action 
production that locates the indeterminism in a non-trivial way that allows for free action.  
This is what I have dubbed “Strawson’s Challenge.”  It is a challenge to libertarian 
philosophers to show where indeterminism could possibly be introduced such that it 
enables the agent to act freely. 
3.1.1. Strawson’s Challenge 
Strawson considers several possible responses to his challenge.  Consider: 
 
Assume that a particular action A performed by a is truly and fully 
explicable by reference to a reason-state R made up of desire(s) D and 
belief(s) B (or by reference to events characterizable in terms of desire and 
belief), while it also has an indeterministic input X among its antecedents.  
The question is, where can X be? (18). 
 
The libertarian cannot respond by locating X, the indeterministic input, between R, the 
reason-state, and A, the action, because that would mean that A would not be truly and 
fully explicable by referencing R.  R would determine that the agent order a salad, for 
example, but before the action can be expressed the indeterminate X causes the agent to 
order a burger instead.  It is hard to imagine that an agent can be held responsible for 
such an action.  The agents does not do anything, rather, something happens which 
interferes with what he intended to do.  
 Similarly, the libertarian cannot respond by claiming that X is unconnected with 
R.  If so, then A would again not be truly and fully explicable by referencing R.  Instead, 
A would be explained by referencing the determinate R and the indeterminate X.  
Strawson emphasizes that it is important for the indeterminacy not interrupt the 
connection between the reason state and the action.  This is so because: 
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…it is specifically qua reasons-reflecting, reasons-determined things that 
actions must be shown to be free.  If so, the indeterministic input allegedly 
necessary for free action cannot possibly be supposed to contribute to 
freedom either by interfering with or interrupting the determination of 
actions of reasons or because it is a contributory determining factor that is 
wholly independent of reasons for actions.  So it can play a part only by 
playing a part in shaping or determining what the agent’s reasons for 
actions are. (19) 
 
A constraint upon libertarian accounts of free agency then is that they must be able to 
give an account of free actions such that the action is determined and explained by 
reasons possessed by the agent.  Since X cannot occur between R and A and cannot occur 
separately from R, the libertarian must respond to Strawson’s Challenge by claiming that 
X must be a factor in determining the R that determines the A.  In this way it will still be 
true that A is determined by R and that the reason state R that determined the action A 
could have been otherwise.  My reason state determined that I ordered salad, but because 
of X my reason state could have been different and, as such, I could have ordered 
hamburger.  Placed in the exact same circumstance, I just may.  
 Given that the reason state R is made up of belief(s) B and desire(s) D, then X 
must play a role in determining either B or D or both.  Strawson quickly discounts X 
playing a determining role in the beliefs of an agent.  As rational creatures, we want our 
beliefs to be determined by and to accurately reflect truth and reality.  When faced with 
the choice of whether to believe that I can leap off of a tall building and fly, I do not want 
the content of my belief to depend solely on me.  I want my belief to be a true belief.  
When I order a salad I am, say, acting partly upon a belief that eating vegetables is good 
for me.  I do not want that belief to be in any fashion arbitrary.  Admittedly there may be 
cases in which it is advantageous and perhaps even desirable for our beliefs to not 
correspond to reality.  For example, consider a member of a Nazi concentration camp 
who is able to completely delude himself into believing that the whole thing is an 
elaborate prank.  Won’t he laugh when the trick is revealed and his family and friends are 
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returned to him alive and well.  In general, however, we do not object to the notion of our 
beliefs being determined.  In fact, properly determined true beliefs are (with extreme 
exceptions, perhaps, but still) preferable to agents.  Placing X within the realm of belief 
jeopardizes the relationship between our beliefs and reality and, as such, is not an 
acceptable locale for indeterminism. 
 Since X cannot be located within B (which precludes it from being located in both 
B and D), then X must be located within D.  If X is to play a role at all, it must play a role 
in determining the desires of the agent.  Thus far we have departed from talking of true 
self-determination in favor of mere indetermination represented by X.  However, to show 
that X is not helpful when considered as a determining factor of D the notion of true self-
determination must be brought back in.  The question then becomes how the introduction 
of an indetermined cause of D could possibly help to establish true self-determination.  
The libertarian must be able to show how the agent is responsible for having those desires 
partly determined by X.   
 Thus far the type of determination dealt with has been mainly actions determined 
by reasons.  Now consideration must be given to another type of determination, that of 
reasons being determined by agents.  If I choose to order the salad because I desire to 
stick to my diet, I cannot be truly responsible for performing the action unless I was also 
somehow responsible for possessing the desire that determined the action.  If the desire 
was the result of a choice on my part, that choice must have been made according to (and 
be determined by and explicable by) reasons for choosing the desire.  If no reason can be 
given for possessing the desire, i.e., if the desire was the result of an indeterminate 
process, then I cannot be truly self-determining with respect to that desire nor the 
resulting action.  If I did choose the desire for reasons, then the choice to accept the 
desire was determined by those reasons and I cannot be truly self-determined with respect 
to choosing the desire nor performing the action unless the reasons for choosing the 
desire were self-determined.  The regress either extends deterministically beyond the time 
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I existed or comes to an arbitrary, undetermined, stopping point.  Either way I am not 
truly self-determined.   
 Hence, X cannot play a causal role in the desires possessed by an agent.  Since 
Strawson has shown earlier that X cannot occur in any other place, it appears that the 
libertarian is stuck.  The argument against the inclusion of indeterminism is given twice 
by Strawson (16-17).  The second, shorter, formulation is: 
 
1)  It is undeniable that one is the way one is as a result of one’s heredity and 
experience. 
 
2)  One cannot somehow accede to true responsibility for oneself by trying to 
change the way one is as a result of heredity and experience, for 
 
3)  Both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself and 
the degree of one’s success in the attempt at change, will be determined by 
how one already is as a result of heredity and experience.   
 
To be truly self-determined, an agent must somehow be able to choose her reason state 
without that choice being determined.  Yet, as Strawson has shown, that choice cannot be 
simply indeterminate without violating true self-determination.  
3.1.2. Robert Kane 
In the previous chapter I have discussed and criticized the libertarian philosophy 
of Robert Kane.  It would be informative here to discuss how Kane seems to answer 
Strawson’s Challenge.  He does so by placing indeterminacy, the X, between the reason 
state, R, and the action, A.  However, he attempts to do so without destroying the 
rationality of the action.  He does so by rejecting what he refers to as one-way rationality 
in favor of plural rationality.  In his philosophy, the agent can possess multiple competing 
reason states, R1, R2, R3…Rn, each of which can result in an action for which the agent 
can be held responsible. The indeterminacy, X¸ determines which reason state will win 
out.  In this way X has been introduced without threatening the rationality of the resulting 
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action and, since the reason state that produced the action was one for which the agent 
was responsible, the agent is responsible for the resulting action.  Kane’s placement of 
the X also serves as a challenge to the third step in Strawson’s argument.  The degree of 
success of one’s effort to perform an action over another (choose one reason state over 
another) is precisely where X is introduced.  The effort is an indeterminate effort.3  
Though this appears to satisfactorily answer Strawson’s Challenge, Kane’s account is 
troublesome for reasons I have already outlined in the previous chapter. 
3.1.3. Special Intervention 
As mentioned earlier, there were three versions of self-determination.  The first 
version was discarded because it was not consistent with libertarian ideas of freedom and, 
hence, was not true self-determination.  The second version was examined and discarded 
because of an inability to place indeterminism within the decision making process of an 
agent.  There remains the third version, however, in which an agent can be truly self-
determining even if his reason state is not self-determined.  This is so because of a special 
interventionary choice performed by the agent to do other than what the reason state has 
determined.  This special choice is somehow not determined by the beliefs and desires 
which have (admittedly) been determined by forces outside of the agent’s control.  There 
I sit in the restaurant.  My reason state determines that I order a salad but, before the 
order to the waiter can escape my lips, I suddenly intervene in my action determining 
process to order hamburger.  But why did I do this?  Did another waiter pass by to deliver 
a hamburger to another customer and the smell of it made my mouth water?  Did I 
remember that there had recently been trouble with illegal and dangerous pesticides being 
used on crops of lettuce?  Can I explain why I altered my choice? 
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 If the answer is yes, then it seems that I made the special interventionary choice 
based upon another reason set of beliefs and desires and, as such, it was equally as 
determined as my original intention of ordering the salad.  If no explanation is possible 
for the altering of my choice, then we are faced with explaining how the decision is one 
for which I am responsible as opposed to one that just happened.   
Strawson additionally makes the stronger claim that if this were somehow true, if 
the special intervention existed and somehow resulted in a choice for which we are 
responsible, then we are not free with respect to any action for which we can provide a 
full and rational explanation.  If we are free only in virtue of the special intervention, then 
it seems we are only free when we exercise this special power.  Though I agree with his 
general argument against this type of indeterminism, I do not think he is justified in 
making this stronger claim.  The libertarian who holds this position can argue (again, 
provided that it is agreed that the special intervention does result in a free choice for 
which the agent is responsible) that in cases where no intervention is made the power to 
intervene was present but not exercised.  Or rather, it was exercised but its result did not 
conflict with what was determined by the reason state.  My environment has conditioned 
me to strongly desire hamburgers.  At the restaurant, when faced with the choice of 
hamburger or salad, my reason state determines that I choose salad.  Additionally, I 
exercise my special interventionary powers.  I can either choose to go against my reason 
state and order the salad or choose to order the hamburger in agreement with my reason 
state.  In either case, I am responsible (ex hypothesi) for the resulting action.  Still, 
Strawson has done enough to show that libertarian positions that rest upon indeterminism 
have much to explain. 
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3.1.4. Leibnizian Free Will 
Finally, Strawson considers a Leibnizian view on libertarian free will in which the reason 
state plays an influential role in the determination of action without necessarily being 
sufficient for causing the action.  These reasons can affect one’s decision making process 
without wholly determining the result of the process.  The argument against this view is 
along the same line as Strawson has expressed earlier.  If the agent is able to do other 
than what his reason state dictates, he must do so in virtue of further beliefs and desires 
he possesses.  If this is so, however, he is not truly self-determining and not truly 
responsible for the resulting action.  If such further beliefs and desires are absent, then the 
resulting action is, rationally speaking, random.   
3.1.5. Conclusion 
Though the type of freedom for which true self-determination is necessary seems 
obviously impossible, Strawson argues that it is important to examine because it is 
precisely the type of freedom that most people commit themselves to in everyday talk.  
As such, they have a “crucial role in structuring our attitude to the notion of freedom” 
(28).  However, libertarian philosophers must provide an acceptable answer to 
Strawson’s Challenge to show that indeterminism can aid in actions which are truly free. 
3.2. Nagel’s Problem of Autonomy 
In “The Problem of Autonomy”,4 Thomas Nagel examines the problem of free 
will.  The problem expresses itself when we take an objective view of ourselves and 
others.  In doing so, we seek to explain our actions and the actions of others causally.  My 
not wanting to get caught caused me to not cheat on the exam while Mary’s wanting to 
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pass the exam at any cost caused her to risk cheating.  Initially, Nagel argues, considering 
actions from the objective perspective seems to increase our freedom.  We do not simply 
act, but rather deliberate and consider various courses of action before deciding to act.  
Or, when simply acting, we do so based upon a character that we have previously chosen.  
If taken further enough, however, the objective view destroys what it initially enhances.  
When we step far enough outside of ourselves it is hard to see ourselves and others as 
agents rather than as parts of nature.  My wanting not to get caught results from having 
suffered severe consequences for cheating as a child.  Mary’s wanting to pass at all costs 
is a result of a demanding parent who finds anything less than an A by Mary to be 
unacceptable.   
 Nagel considers two aspects of the problem of free will.  The first is the problem 
of  autonomy and the second is the problem of responsibility.  Traditionally, the problem 
of free will has been discussed relative to the problem of responsibility.  If Mary’s 
decision to cheat was caused by conditions over which she could exercise no control then 
we cannot hold her responsible for the action.  The action was not performed freely.  This 
undermines the reactive attitudes that are conditional to the attribution of responsibility.  
It is of no use to resent Mary for cheating and getting an A because it was not an action 
for which she can be held responsible.  This is true even though we may not be able to 
help having the resentful feelings.5   
 Although the second problem is generally considered as the problem of free will, 
Nagel argues that the problem of autonomy is equally threatening to our conception of 
free will.  The problem of autonomy is the fear that the idea that our own actions are 
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freely performed by us as agents is merely an illusion.  We really do not act at all, but 
rather what we do is only what happens through natural and physical law.   
 The problem of autonomy results in the hopeless situation of wanting something 
impossible.  This is a result of two feelings.  On the one hand the feeling of unease when 
we try to take the objective perspective to heart.  Though the external view cuts away the 
support for our autonomous feelings, “the unstrung attitudes don’t disappear...despite 
their loss of support” (35). No amount of stepping outside of oneself will cause these 
feelings about our autonomy to cease. These feelings, however, are certainly not proof 
that we are free.  To be such a proof, it needs to be shown why they can serve as 
explanations of our freedom rather than simple subjective impressions of how action 
seems to the agent (39).  On the other hand, if we fail to consider the objective 
perspective then we cannot allay the feeling that, if we were to look from a distant 
enough perspective, an agent’s actions are helpless and not something for which he can 
be held responsible (35).  Nagel argues that no attempt at eliminating the objective 
perspective can alleviate this fear.   
 The problem lies when we try to give a coherent account of what these internal 
impressions of autonomy amount to. Nagel argues that no attempt to provide such a 
coherent account of the internal view of action has been provided.  This is especially 
troublesome because it is just this view that is in danger of being discounted by the 
objective perspective.  “When we try to explain what we believe which seems to be 
undermined by a conception of actions as events in the world - determined or not - we 
end up with something that is either incomprehensible or clearly inadequate” (35).  From 
the inside it seems that we have alternate possibilities open to us.  I can choose to go to 
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class or get some extra sleep.  Whichever possibility is chosen is actualized by my 
choice.  When considered externally, however, it seems that only one of the actions was 
actually possible, the one that actually occurred.  My eventual decision to go to class and 
forgo the extra sleep is explainable as, say, an expression of my character.  A character 
that I could not have freely chosen. 
 Though we accept a subordination of subjective appearance to objective reality in 
other areas, we cannot accept it in the area of free will.  Nagel argues that this is so 
because action is too ambitious - the idea of our autonomy is not simply a feeling but 
rather a belief.  We cannot regard our feeling of freedom as being mere appearance 
without giving up this belief.  Though he considers this belief to be unintelligible, Nagel 
offers a description of what our ordinary conception of autonomy is.  It is the belief that 
antecedent circumstances, including the character of the agent, are not sufficient to 
determine all action.  Somehow, the agent can choose to break the causal chain by 
making a choice that is both inexplicable by antecedent causes yet remains a choice for 
which the agent can be held responsible.  The final explanation of the resulting action is 
not causal but rather intentional.  This intentional explanation is comprehensible only 
from my point of view from which “[m]y reason for doing it is the whole reason why it 
happened, and no further explanation is either necessary or possible” (37).6 
 The external view does not allow for intentional explanations, but rather only 
causal explanations.  The absence of causal explanation then amounts to having no 
explanation at all for why an action occurred.  For the libertarian to defend his notion of 
freedom, he must require that such intentional explanation be acknowledged.  The 
problem is that this only gives a correct surface description of our “prereflective sense of 
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our own autonomy” (38).  Intentional explanation collapses when examined closely, 
however, because it can be given for any resulting action.  Consider Sally, a high school 
senior having to choose between two prospective dates to the prom.  The first choice, 
Biff, is a wonderful physical specimen but lacking in brains and charm.  Peter, the other 
possibility, is smart and considerate but not much to look at.  Sally undergoes an internal 
struggle - should she choose the smart guy or the attractive guy?   
 A causal explanation can be given from the external perspective regardless of 
whom she chooses (since, in reality, there was no choice).  If she chooses Peter it is 
because, say, her older sister married a nice guy like him and is deliriously happy.  If she 
chooses Biff it is because, say, she has been influenced by the plight of her mother who 
did not have any fun in her life before settling down.  The action does not determine the 
causal explanation, but rather we can infer which causal explanation has determined the 
action.  
 From the intentional perspective, the causes mentioned previously contribute to 
the resulting action without determining it.7  Space is left for Sally to choose the reasons 
for which to act.  Her possession of an appropriate set of reasons, R1, for choosing Biff 
and another appropriate set of reasons, R2, for choosing Peter render whichever choice 
she makes intelligible, but from the internal perspective they cannot explain why she 
found one set of reasons more appropriate than the other.  To do so intelligibly she would 
need to appeal to other sets of reasons – an appropriate set of reasons, R3, for choosing to 
accept R1 over R2 and an appropriate set of reasons, R4, for choosing R2 over R1.  
Additionally, the choice of either of those reason sets would have to be made based upon 
a further set of reason states.  Either the regress is infinite or there is an arbitrary stopping 
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point.  Hence, intentional explanation collapses because it cannot explain why the agent 
chose one set of reason over other, equally intelligible sets of reasons. 
3.2.1. Robert Kane 
Nagel’s problem of autonomy serves as a serious objection to libertarian 
philosophies in general and Kane’s philosophy in particular.  Kane attempts to answer 
this type of problem by arguing that we cannot be an eliminative materialist when it 
comes to human action.  In Nagel’s terminology, we cannot give up the internal 
perspective for the external perspective.  For Kane, both the internal perspective and the 
external perspective are equally valid as explanations for our actions.  These intentional 
explanations8 cannot be given up without writing free will out of the picture.  Kane 
rightly points out that this is a problem that all materialistic accounts of free agency 
share, both compatibilist and libertarian.  This is good enough for Kane’s purposes, but 
not a sufficient response to the problem of autonomy.  Nagel’s problem of autonomy asks 
the libertarian to explain how an agent can hold onto his internal feeling that his action is 
free when faced with the problems that arise from taking an objective view of his action.  
Kane does not do this – there is no how, merely a somehow.  This problem will be solved, 
according to Kane, when the greater problem of consciousness is solved. 
3.3. Dennett’s Compatibilist Shift 
In “On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want,”9 Daniel Dennett engages 
in a bit of subterfuge by offering the libertarian philosopher a framework in which a 
motion that results from indeterminacy can correctly be viewed as an action.  I’ll get to 
the subterfuge later, but first I’ll describe how he proceeds.   
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 Dennett imagines placing a person in an “answer box”.  This box has two buttons 
(a “yes” button and a “no” button) and two pedals (again, a “yes” and a “no”).  Also 
within the box is a display screen that says either “use the buttons” or “use the pedals”.  
The subject is then asked a series of ten simple yes or no questions and responds by either 
using the buttons or the pedals depending upon what the display instructs.  However, 
whether the display says “use the buttons” or “use the pedals” is based on an 
indeterminate process (perhaps, via a radium randomizer). 
 Dennett then considers whether a physicist could in principle predict the subject’s 
behavior.  The physicist is given foreknowledge of the initial conditions of the subject as 
well as the answers to the ten easy questions.  Because of the introduction of 
indeterminacy, the physicist could at best answer with a series of “if...then” statements.  
If the display says “use the pedals” when question one is asked, then the subject will 
press the pedal which corresponds to “yes”.  (This is very general.  The physicist’s actual 
prediction would involve the motion of atoms of some type causing motion of other 
atoms which result in macro movement.  The more general description demonstrates the 
point well enough).  Dennett compares the results of the physicist with the results of an 
intentionalist who tries to perform the same task.  The intentionalist can, upon reading the 
questions, predict that the subject will answer “yes” to questions (say) 1, 2, 7 and 9 and 
will answer “no” to all others.  It is important to note that there are no “if’s” or “maybe’s” 
in the prediction of the intentionalist.  This serves as an instance in which indetermination 
is placed within a system without entailing that accurate predictions can not be made 
about the performance of the system.  The predictive power of the physicist and the 
intentionalist are equivalent.  But in our everyday talk about predicting, so Dennett 
   
- 63 - 
argues, we are not interested in the type of predictions that occur on the purely physical 
description provided by the physicist.  Rather, we are interested in being able to predict 
actions.  This type of prediction can be made from the intentional stance.  Dennett then 
places the “answer box” within an agent in an attempt to discern what would result. 
 Suppose that I decide that I want to insult my neighbor and that the decision was a 
result of a determinate process.  The act of insulting my neighbor, however, can be 
accomplished in an infinite number of ways.  For the sake of the example, I favor no 
particular insult over any other and any choice of expression is arbitrary.  Dennett 
considers the effect of placing the “answer box” at this point.  I choose to perform an 
action, but how the action is actually expressed is (insofar as I don’t care about how it is 
done) decided by an indeterminate decision making process.  The “answer box” functions 
merely as tie-breaker.  In this way indeterminism can be introduced yet accurate 
predictions can be made by the intentionalist as to human behavior.  Dennett argues that 
this does not give the libertarian what he says he wants, however.  “The libertarian would 
not be relieved to learn that although his decision to murder his neighbor was quite 
determined, the style and trajectory of the death blow was not” (49).   
 Having demonstrated that indeterminism could function within the agent without 
interfering with the intentionalist's predictive power, Dennett turns to the task of placing 
the indeterminism in a place that would be acceptable to the libertarian.  To do so, he 
discusses the role time pressure has in the decision making process of humans.  It may be 
that if we were not under time constraints then we would always act rationally (and 
determinately).  Consider the case of a high school senior deciding which college to 
attend.  If there were no time constraints, it would be arguably possible for her to take 
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into consideration each and every possible advantage and disadvantage that each college 
offers.  Time is a factor, however, and she cannot come close to exhausting these 
considerations.  The student must rely upon a heuristic decision making process.  Dennett 
argues that whichever (of the exhaustive) considerations the student does base her 
decision upon are brought about through an indeterminate process.  The agent makes her 
choice (a choice for which she is responsible) based upon reasons that are in part 
generated through this indeterminate process.  After choosing one school over the other, 
she can slap herself in the head for failing to think of a relevant consideration under 
which (had it occurred to her previously) she would have made a different choice.  She 
chose school A, for example, but did not take into account that her uncle teaches at 
school B and could help show her the ropes.  Had she remembered her uncle at the time 
of choice, she would have chosen B.  Nevertheless, it was still the agent’s choice.  
Dennett argues that, to the extent that indeterminism can make sense in theories of 
agency, the indetermination must occur in a place such as this.  Otherwise indeterminism 
would be installed in a “harmless place by installing it in an irrelevant place” (49).   
3.3.1. Absolute and Relative Randomness10 
Earlier I mentioned that Dennett would engage in subterfuge when he describes 
how indeterminacy can be introduced into the decision making process of an agent while 
still having the resulting choice and action being one for which is the agent can be held 
responsible.  The subterfuge rests upon an ambiguity concerning the type of randomness 
entailed by indetermination.   
 In the sense of indetermination that Dennett has used in his “answer box” 
example, the resulting expression of the action was what I shall call absolutely random.  
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In the answer box example, the absolute randomness was generated via a radium 
randomizer.  From the scientific perspective, which way I insulted my neighbor was not 
predictable in principle because of the nature of the indeterminacy introduced.  This is 
because the answer box was connected to a “radium randomizer” that, presumably, is not 
predictable in principle.  However, absolute randomness in the sense I am employing is a 
stronger notion than this.  Not only is it not predictable in principle for humanity, but not 
even an omniscient being could predict what will result.  This is because the 
indeterminacy is ontological, as opposed to epistemic, in nature.   
 Consider a second form of indeterminacy, that which is relatively random. This is 
the weaker and more natural form of unpredictability in principle.  Consider if Einstein 
was right in claiming that God does not play dice with the universe.  In this case there 
could be no absolute random actions, i.e., actions that even an omniscient observer could 
not predict.  Because of the nature of the universe it could be the case that certain events 
are destined to remain outside of the explanatory power of humanity.  These events, 
though epistemically unpredictable in principle for humanity, are nonetheless 
ontologically determined and predictable by the omniscient observer.  Lacking 
omniscience, some events that are not absolutely random will always appear absolutely 
random, that is, epistemically random relative to us.  These events are not predictable in 
principle with respect to beings with finite knowledge but completely predictable by an 
omniscient being. 
3.3.2. The Compatibilist Shift 
Of the two types of randomness I have just discussed, libertarian philosophers 
would appeal to absolute randomness to explain freedom of the agent.  This is so, 
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obviously, because relative randomness is compatible with determinism and libertarian 
freedom is not.  Dennett’s point can be seen, however, when what I refer to as a 
“Compatibilist Shift” is performed on indeterministic libertarian theories of agency.  The 
shift occurs by first locating the role that absolute randomness plays in the indeterminist 
libertarian theory of free agency.  Once located, absolute randomness is replaced with 
relative randomness.  Theories of agency or freedom that are incompatibilist thus can 
shift and become theories of agency or freedom that are compatibilist.   
 The Compatibilist Shift gives rise to a dilemma for libertarians who rely upon 
absolute randomness to gain freedom.  On the one hand, the libertarian could admit that 
the “shifted” compatibilist theories do provide an adequate account of freedom and free 
agency.  However, the libertarian cannot admit this and still be a libertarian.  Alternately, 
the libertarian could die in the ditch for absolute randomness and argue that no account of 
freedom or free agency that uses relative randomness without absolute randomness can 
truly capture libertarian freedom.  This seems odd because the “shifted” compatibilist 
accounts are just as rich and as lively as their libertarian counterparts excepting the small 
change that occurs.  If the libertarian was able to produce a coherent theory of agency 
that uses absolute randomness (and this is a large supposition), then the compatibilist can 
adopt it and substitute absolute randomness with relative randomness.  At the very least, 
the libertarian should admit that such shifted accounts are more acceptable than other 
compatibilist accounts that do not employ relative randomness. 
To the extent that we cannot prove that the randomness in the world is absolute or 
merely relative, the theories of agency (indeterminate libertarian ones and their “shifted” 
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counterparts) would function in an exactly similar manner. Dennett discusses the chance 
of such a discover in a later work, Elbow Room: 
 
...it is extremely unlikely, given the complexity of the brain at even the 
molecular level, that we could ever develop good evidence that any 
particular act was…a large-scale effect of a critical subatomic 
indeterminacy.  So if someone’s responsibility for an act did hinge on 
whether, at the moment of decision, that decision was (already) 
determined by a prior state of the world, then barring a triumphant return 
of universal determinism in microphysics, the odds are very heavy that we 
will never have any reason to believe of any particular act that it was or 
was not responsible.  The critical difference would be utterly inscrutable 
from every macroscopic vantage point, and practically inscrutable from 
the most sophisticated microphysical vantage point imaginable.  Some 
philosophers might take comfort in this conclusion, but I would guess that 
only a philosopher could take comfort in it.11 
 
In this passage Dennett doubts that we will ever learn which type of randomness actually 
holds, whether it be what I have labeled absolute randomness or what I have labeled 
relative randomness.  Quantum physics, for example, teaches that there are indeed 
undetermined processes on the sub-atomic level.  This does not preclude us from learning 
in the future (through advances in technology, say) that the indeterminacy is merely 
relative and has a more foundational, determined, explanation.  Wherever the 
investigation into the nature of the universe ends, there is always the possibility that there 
is another more foundational layer, either undiscovered or undiscoverable, that may not 
correspond to the previous scientific theories. 
Libertarian philosophers can agree with this while not agreeing that the problem 
of free will is epistemic in nature.  They can agree that we will never know what the truth 
actually is while still arguing that the libertarian theories come closer to capturing our 
everyday notions of freedom and its link with responsibility.  However, at the very least 
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Dennett has shown the libertarian philosopher that a compatibilist theory of agency may 
not be as counter-intuitive as once thought.  
3.3.3. Robert Kane 
The Compatibilist Shift is a useful tool for compatibilists who wish to criticize 
libertarian accounts of freedom and free agency like Kane’s that rest upon absolute 
randomness.12  I have used the strategy of the Compatibilist Shift to show that Kane’s 
account serves to strengthen the intuitions that underlie compatibilist accounts of freedom 
and free agency in the previous chapter.  This was done when I noted that a compatibilist 
version of Kane’s account could easily be given by substituting a type of relative 
randomness for the absolute determinism of the “magic dice.”13  I do not further develop 
it here.  What I do note here is that Kane claims that the answer to the problem of 
autonomy is found in the answer to the problem of consciousness.  It would seem odd, 
then, if Kane stuck to his libertarian guns were the problem of consciousness to be solved 
in a way that favors compatibilism.  Most compatibilists would not be in a similar 
position were the problem of consciousness to be solved in a way that favors 
incompatibilism.  This is so because most compatibilists argue that freedom of the will is 
compatible with both determinism and indeterminism.14 
3.4. Objection from Rational Explanation  
In “Libertarianism and Rationality,”15 Richard Double criticizes defenses of 
libertarianism provided by Peter van Inwagen and Kane.16  In doing so, Double argues 
that neither account leaves room for the reasonableness of libertarian free choices.  I refer 
Double’s argument as the “Objection from Rational Explanation.” 
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 Both van Inwagen and Kane are concerned that compatibilist accounts of freedom 
are not sufficient for attributing freedom and responsibility to agents.  Van Inwagen’s 
popular argument against compatibilism is the worry that what we do is not “up to us” 
because what we do is determined by the laws of nature and events of the remote past.  
Kane expresses similar misgivings by appealing to a notion of “ultimate responsibility” 
that is lacking in compatibilist accounts of freedom.   
 Both libertarians appeal to indeterminism to escape their worries but differ in 
where the indeterminacy is placed.  Kane locates the indeterminacy in the psychological 
states that occur before a choice is made.  Philosophers who locate indeterminacy before 
the moment of choice are referred to by Double as “Valerian libertarians.”17  Non-
Valerians, as typified by van Inwagen (as well as Kant, Taylor, and Chisholm), hope to 
achieve freedom by placing the indeterminacy at the moment of choice while keeping all 
previous psychological factors the same.  Both accounts are discussed in light of Kane’s 
Condition of Ultimate Dominion (CUD) (59).18  
 CUD has two requirements for a free choice.  The first is that “the agent’s making 
the choice rather than doing otherwise...can be explained by saying that the agent 
rationally willed at t to do so”.  The second, that “no further explanation can be given for 
the agent’s choosing rather than doing otherwise...that is an explanation of conditions 
whose existence cannot be explained by the agent’s choosing or rationally willing 
something at t” (ibid.).  Double refers to the first requirement as the requirement for 
rational explanation and the second as the requirement for indeterminacy. 
 Double takes CUD to be an accurate description of the type of requirement that 
must be met by any satisfactory libertarian view.  He argues first that van Inwagen’s 
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account of free will is a clear violation of CUD and second that Kane’s account, while 
not violating CUD, does so at the price of producing “a theory that is weak on its 
rationality commitment without enjoying the incompatibilist advantages of van 
Inwagen’s view” (ibid.). 
3.4.1. Peter van Inwagen 
Van Inwagen’s account of free will is illustrated by his example of a thief who 
sometimes while stealing money remembers the face of his mother as she lay dying.  On 
her deathbed he had promised her to give up his thievery and lead an honest life.  Though 
the memory of his mother appears every time the thief steals, it is only successful in 
preventing him from stealing roughly half of the time.  In each case, however, it is true 
that given the same psychological state and antecedent circumstances there exist some 
possible worlds in which the thief proceeded with the theft and others in which he did 
not.  
 Double argues that van Inwagen’s account and other non-Valerian accounts do 
not satisfy CUD’s rationality requirement.  To show why, Double introduces “the 
Principle of Rational Explanation (PRE)” (60) which states that: 
 
Citing a person’s reasoning process R rationally explains a choice C only 
if the probability of C given R is greater than the probability of not C 
given R. 
 
PRE is seen as a minimal requirement for rational explanation.  Given my belief that the 
pursuit of higher education is noble and my strong desire to be noble, my choice to 
pursue a higher education can be rationally explained.  However, this belief and desire 
would not serve as a rational explanation for my quitting school and joining the circus.  
In the first case, the belief and desire have, say, a higher than .5 probability of 
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determining my choice.  In the second case, the belief and desire are irrelevant to the 
choice so do not serve as a rational explanation.   
 Returning to van Inwagen’s thief, Double considers whether PRE is met.  It is 
given that the thief’s psychological state is the same regardless of whether he continues 
with his theft or turns away empty handed.  Consider this psychological state P.  
However, if P is to serve as a rational explanation for the resulting action, it must be that 
P more likely determines one particular action over another.  Given that P is the same in 
every case, there are three possibilities.  Either P tends to determine that the thief 
continues with his theft, or P tends to determine that the thief discontinues his theft, or P 
equally tends to determine either outcome.  In the first two cases, P can only serve as a 
rational explanation (via PRE) in the event that the action that has a higher probability to 
result actually results.  If the less probabilistic action occurs then P would be precluded as 
a rational explanation by PRE.  In the latter case, in which P equally tends to determine 
each outcome, P cannot serve as a rational explanation for either resulting action.  Since 
P is neutral with respect to which action to undertake, P is irrelevant to the rational 
explanation of that action.  It may be the case that rather than equally tending to 
determine each outcome P instead sometimes favors one (when the recollection of his 
mother’s face is particularly vivid) over another (when the thief is starving).  In this case, 
however, it is hard to argue that the thief is in the same P when committing either act.  
Rather two different psychological states would be involved, P1 and P2.  P1 would serve 
as a rational explanation for action A1 (why the thief did not steal) and P2 would serve as 
a rational explanation for action A2 (why he did steal).  But this is certainly not what the 
non-Valerian is after. 
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3.4.2. Robert Kane 
Though damning for the non-Valerian, Kane’s account of free practical choices is 
in accord with both PRE and CUD.  Consider again psychological states P1 and P2 of van 
Inwagen’s thief.  In Kane’s account, P1 would serve as a rational explanation of A1 and P2 
would serve as a rational explanation of A2, but whether P1 or P2 is actually the 
psychological state of the thief is undetermined.19  Therefore it is true that his 
psychological state can serve as a rational explanation for his action under PRE (and the 
first requirement of CUD) and that there would be no further explanation given that falls 
outside of the agent’s choice or rational willing (or the second requirement of CUD).  
This is so because whether the face of the thief’s mother appears prominently or not is 
undetermined.  However, if her face does so appear the agent can do no other but refrain 
from the theft.  Should her face not so appear then the thief can do no other but continue 
the theft.  In either case, however, it is true that the thief could have done otherwise 
because his psychological state could have been otherwise.   
 Double offers three strong criticisms for Kane’s view. The first is an objection 
raised by Dennett concerning Valerian accounts of free will.20  It is hard to see how the 
agent can be held truly responsible considering that the agent is not responsible for the 
psychological state that determines the action.  Once the undetermined event occurs then 
the action flows in a determinate fashion.  Because of this indetermination does not help 
the rationality of the choice.  How can the thief be responsible for the theft if his doing so 
is determined by the lack of a psychological state of which he has no control? 
 Secondly, the indeterminate events make no contributions to the psychological 
state that determines the action unless the agent first examines and interprets said events.  
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In the case of the thief, it is true that the strong image of his mother’s face occurs 
indeterministically.  However, once it does occur it is up to the thief to decide whether 
this event plays a determining role in his decision making process.  If this is so, however, 
then the decision whether or not to let the event affect him must also be a choice for 
which a rational explanation is given.  This second rational explanation can only be given 
via an undetermined event that the agent must also decide to accept or reject.  Hence, an 
infinite regress of rational explanations and undetermined events.   
 The final criticism is that the Valerian approach does not admit categorical 
contracausal freedom in the way that non-Valerian approaches do.  Given the 
circumstances an agent was in at the moment of choice, it is simply false that the agent 
could have chosen other than what he does in the categorical contracausal sense.  Rather, 
he can only have chosen otherwise provided that his psychological state had resulted 
from a different undetermined event.  This contracausal freedom is no more than the type 
espoused by compatibilist accounts of freedom.     
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter I have discussed several problems that indeterminist accounts of 
freedom and free agency face.  I am not aware of any account that can successfully fend 
off each of these objections.  However, in the next chapter I pretend that one such 
account exists in order to discuss some further problems that it may face. 
3.6 End Notes 
 
1 O’Connor (1996), 13-32.  All page numbers in this chapter refer to this O’Connor text. 
 
2 This example is similar to Dennett’s example of Martin Luther (at least as Kane 
employs it) that I have discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
   
- 74 - 
 
3 This is a simplified account of his philosophy, for a more fleshed out version please see 
chapter two. 
 
4 O’Connor (1996), 33-42. 
 
5 See Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” in Watson (1982). 
 
6 Roderick Chisholm argues similarly in “Human Freedom and the Self” when he claims 
that “in one very strict sense of the terms, there can be no science of man.”  Watson 
(1982), 24-35. 
 
7 This is very similar to the Leibnizian account discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter. 
 
8 Or, as he calls them, phenomenological and folk psychological explanations. 
 
9 O’Connor (1996), 43-56. 
 
10  Absolute randomness and relative randomness are my terms, not Dennett’s. 
 
11 Dennett (1984), 136. 
 
12 As opposed to those that rely upon mysterious forms of causation or entities which 
Kane has outlawed via his Free Agency Principle. 
 
13 The magic dice are discussed in section 2.3.2 of this work. 
 
14 At the very least, they argue that freedom does not imply indeterminism. 
 
15 O’Connor (1996), 57-65 
 
16 Double refers to Kane’s Free Will and Values, an earlier work than what I have 
discussed in chapter two.  Van Inwagen’s position is taken from An Essay on Free Will. 
 
17 After a citing by Daniel Dennett of Paul Valery’s claim that invention is selection 
among choices that occur to one randomly. 
 
18 Kane’s CUD is an earlier precursor to condition UR that is discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
 
19 This is so in Kane’s later work because the effort to place one P over another is an 
indeterminate effort. 
 
20 In Dennett (1978), 297-98. 
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4. The Limits of Indeterministic Freedom 
 Even if libertarian theories of freedom and agency like Kane’s could be made 
intelligible, they face the problem of not allowing us to be as free as we may like.  Even 
if we possess libertarian freedom, it may also be true that in almost every instance we are 
not able to do other than what we do.  This again raises the problem of moral 
responsibility because we intuitively do not think that we should hold each other 
responsible if we could not do other than what we in fact do.  In this chapter, I examine 
three articles, two by Peter van Inwagen and one by John Martin Fischer and Mark 
Ravizza.  Van Inwagen argues that even if libertarians are correct, we are not able to do 
otherwise as often as we think but are rather only able to do so in special circumstances.  
Fischer and Ravizza object and argue that circumstances in which we are able to do 
otherwise occur more often than van Inwagen claims and also argue that van Inwagen’s 
view has unacceptable consequences for moral responsibility.   
4.1. Introduction 
Peter van Inwagen begins “When is the Will Free?” 1 by stating that his argument 
will depend upon thinking of the problem of free will and determinism in this “classical 
tradition” in which an agent is ascribed “free will” if at some time it is true that he can 
choose to pursue either of incommensurable alternatives available to him.  Within this 
tradition, van Inwagen argues that philosophers come to be libertarians by (implicitly or 
explicitly) relying upon a rule of inference that is something like what he refers to as 
“Beta.”   
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A central problem in the debate over the problem of free will lies in the 
interpretation of the phrase “could have done otherwise” or “can do otherwise”.  For van 
Inwagen, there is a single interpretation which compatibilists and incompatibilists alike 
agree upon.  Under this interpretation, an agent truly “can do otherwise” or “could have 
done otherwise” only if his doing so does not either cause a previous state of the universe 
to be altered or cause a law of nature to be broken.  In other words, all past events being 
equally unalterable and under the same laws of nature, the agent can perform either of 
two incommensurable acts.  A central thesis of his paper is that though compatibilists can 
argue that there are numerous occasions upon which agents are able to do otherwise, 
incompatibilists must conclude that being able to do otherwise is a relatively rare 
condition.  
 In “When the Will is Free”,2 John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza criticize what 
they refer to as the “restrictive incompatibilism” or “restrictivism” of Peter van Inwagen.  
Fischer and Ravizza describe van Inwagen’s position in this manner because if van 
Inwagen’s position is true (and determinism false) then incompatibilists must accept 
radical restrictions on one’s ability to do otherwise.  Fischer’s and Ravizza’s two main 
criticisms are first that one can be an incompatibilist without being committed to the 
restrictivist position, and second that restrictive incompatibilists cannot provide a 
satisfying theory of moral accountability while still remaining within the classical 
tradition. 
 In “When the Will is Not Free”,3 Peter van Inwagen responds to three criticisms 
leveled by Fischer and Ravizza.  The first is that incompatibilist do not have to accept the 
validity of Beta; the second that the validity of Beta does not entail that we are able to act 
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otherwise as seldom as van Inwagen claims; and the third that restrictivism entails that 
we can seldom if ever be held morally accountable for what we have done.   
 This chapter is broken into three main parts to correspond to three main bones of 
contention between van Inwagen on one side and Fischer and Ravizza on the other.  
Additionally, each main section is broken into three sub-sections.  In the first sub-
sections, I outline van Inwagen’s position as described in “When is the Will Free?” (this 
article will be referred to as VI(a) for van Inwagen (a)).  In the second sub-sections, I 
discuss the objections raised by Fischer and Ravizza in “When the Will is Free”.  In each 
third sub-section I describe van Inwagen’s response to Fischer and Ravizza as described 
in “When the Will is Not Free” (this article will be referred to simply as VI(b) for van 
Inwagen (b)) while both criticizing said responses and also providing independent 
arguments to show that Fischer’s and Ravizza’s objections do not hold.     
The three bones of contention are theses proposed by van Inwagen in VI(a).  They 
are as follows: 
(1) In order to be an incompatibilist one must accept as valid a rule of inference that 
van Inwagen has labeled “Beta”; 
(2) Beta implies that we are seldom if ever able to otherwise; and 
(3) The previous claim does not entail that agents can only seldom if ever be held 
morally accountable for their actions.  
4.2. Incompatibilism and Beta-Like Rules 
Van Inwagen argues that incompatibilists must accept Beta as a valid rule of 
inference.  In this section, I discuss van Inwagen’s argument as well as Fischer’s and 
Ravizza’s objection.  They attempt to provide an argument for incompatibilism that does 
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not rely upon Beta but rather employs two fixity principles (fixity of the past and fixity of 
the laws of nature).  Van Inwagen and I both argue that their attempt to provide an 
argument for incompatibilism using the fixity principles fails because we cannot derive 
the absurd conclusion that we are unable to do other than we do from the two fixity 
principles. 
4.2.1. van Inwagen – Rule Beta 
Van Inwagen claims that, generally, persons become incompatibilists because 
they are convinced by an argument which relies on two rules of deduction involving p 
(which stands for any true proposition) and the operator ‘N’ where ‘Np’ stands for “p and 
no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p” (224).4  These two rules are: 
 
Rule Alpha:  From p deduce Np. (Where ‘ ’ represents “standard 
necessity”:  truth in all possible circumstances.) 




Let ‘P’ represent any true proposition, ‘L’ represent the conjunction into a single 
proposition all of the laws of nature, and ‘P
o
’ represent a proposition that gives a 
complete and accurate description of the whole world at an instant in the past before 
human life had evolved.  If determinism is true, then (P
o
 & L ⇒ P).  The argument 
that van Inwagen uses to support the falsity of determinism is as follows: 
1. (P
o
 & L ⇒ P) 
2.  (P
o
 ⇒ (L ⇒ P))   1; modal and sentential logic 
3.  N(P
o
 ⇒ (L ⇒ P))   2; Rule Alpha 
4.  NP
o
                         Premise  
5.  N(L ⇒ P)                 3, 4; Rule Beta 
6.  NL                           Premise 
7.  NP                           5, 6; Rule Beta 
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If this argument is sound it entails that no one has or ever had any choice about anything, 
including what any given person does.  Since this result is absurd to libertarians, 
determinism is shown to be false.  Van Inwagen does not think anyone could dispute 
Rule Alpha or the two premises, so the soundness of the argument rests on the validity of 
Rule Beta.  He does not defend Rule Beta here, but does claim that one would have no 
reason for being an incompatibilist if one did not accept it. Van Inwagen will have more 
to say about Beta in sub-section 4.2.3.  Now I turn my attention to Fischer’s and 
Ravizza’s objections to Beta’s relationship to incompatibilism. 
4.2.2.  Fischer and Ravizza – Beta Jeopardized 
Though there are many Consequence arguments used by incompatibilists, van 
Inwagen argues that in any form they must rely on a rule of inference similar to Rule 
Beta.  Fischer and Ravizza admit that many forms of the Consequence argument do rely 
on intuitions similar to those that underlie van Inwagen’s Rule Beta, but they argue that it 
is false that one must accept Rule Beta to be an incompatibilist.  To prove this, Fischer 
and Ravizza provide a sketch of an argument for incompatibilism that employs two 
principles that do not rely on Rule Beta.  The two principles are the fixity of the past and 
the fixity of the laws of nature. 
 
(FP) For any action Y, agent S, and time T, if it is true that if S were to do 
Y at T, some fact about the past relative to T would not have been a 
fact, then S cannot do Y at T. 
(FL) For any action Y, and agent S, if it is true that if S were to do Y, some 
natural law which actually obtains would not obtain, then S cannot 
do Y.  
 
Consider some act X that agent A actually refrains from doing at T2.  If 
determinism is true (and is taken as the thesis that a complete description 
of the world at T in conjunction with a complete formulation of the laws 
entails every subsequent truth), and S1 is the total state of the world at T1, 
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then one of the following conditionals must be true: 
 








(2) If A were to do X at T
2
, then some natural law that actually obtains 
would not obtain. 
(3) If A were to do X at T
2
, then either S
1
 would not have been the total 
state of the world at T
1
, or some natural law that actually obtains 
would not obtain. (244) 
 
As stated in the excerpt, Fischer and Ravizza argue that determinism in conjunction with 
FP and FL entail the truth of at least one of the numbered statements.  However, if (1) is 
true then A cannot do X at T2 because of FP, if (2) is true then A cannot do X at T2 
because of FL, and if (3) is true then A cannot do X at T2 because of FP or FL.  Therefore, 
if determinism is true then A cannot do anything other than what he does at T2.  Fischer 
and Ravizza argue that this incompatibilist argument does not rely on any Beta-like rule.  
They argue that the two fixity principles have an independent appeal, one that is not owed 
to any support it may or may not receive from a Beta-like rule.  Therefore, “the debate 
over incompatibilism should not be reduced to a discussion about the validity of Beta” 
(244).  Fischer and Ravizza do not argue that Rule Beta is invalid, only that one does not 
have to accept it to be an incompatibilist.  
Additionally, if van Inwagen is not happy with Fischer and Ravizza’s argument, 
they point out that van Inwagen himself has provided two non-Beta arguments that 
purport to prove that determinism is false in his An Essay on Free Will.5   
 It would seem that van Inwagen has a lot of explaining to do if he would still 
maintain that incompatibilists must accept a Beta-like rule.  I now focus my attention on 
his attempt at doing so. 
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4.2.3.  Van Inwagen - Beta Reclaimed 
Fischer and Ravizza provide an example to support their claim that 
incompatibilists need not rely on a rule like Beta.  The example involves the principles of 
the fixity of the past (FP) and the fixity of the laws of nature (FL).  Van Inwagen argues 
both that the argument form employed by Fischer and Ravizza is invalid and that the 
argument does not imply incompatibilism.  He does so by questioning what role FP and 
FL play in Fischer’s and Ravizza’s argument.  
 To support his criticism, van Inwagen considers one of the two arguments he has 
made in An Essay on Free Will that Fischer and Ravizza have criticized as not relying 
upon a Beta-like rule.  The argument is the second “Possible Worlds” argument.  In it, 
van Inwagen uses two premises: 
 
No one has access to a possible world in which the past is different from 
the actual past. 
 
No one has access to a possible world in which the laws are different from 
the actual laws. (VI(b) 96) 
 
 
Like the two fixity principles, the two possible world premises do not on the surface seem 
to rely upon the validity of Beta.  However, van Inwagen questions the basis upon which 
we should accept the two premises.  Van Inwagen provides a valid argument utilizing 
Beta (and Rule Alpha) that supports the second premise.  Suppose that W is a world in 
which some actual law, L, is a false proposition. 
1. (W is actual⇒ L is false) 
hence, 
2. (L is true  ⇒ ~W is actual)   
hence, 
3. N(L is true ⇒ (~W is actual))  [Rule Alpha] 
4.  N(L is true) 
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hence, 
5.  N(~W is actual)                 [3,4 Rule Beta] 
hence, 
6.  No one has access to W.  (VI(b) 97) 
 
 
Failing the acceptance of the validity of this argument, van Inwagen insists, one would 
not have any reason for accepting the second premise of the Possible Worlds argument.6  
Thus, an argument that does not appear on the surface to rest upon Rule Beta, does in fact 
do so. 
 He next turns his attention to the fixity principle argument provided by Fischer 
and Ravizza.  It would be helpful to state the argument again: 
(FP) For any action Y, agent S, and time T, if it is true that if S were to do 
Y at T, some fact about the past relative to T would not have been a 
fact, then S cannot do Y at T. 
(FL) For any action Y, and agent S, if it is true that if S were to do Y, 
some natural law which actually obtains would not obtain, then S 
cannot do Y.  
 
Consider some act X that agent A actually refrains from doing at T2.  If 
determinism is true (and is taken as the thesis that a complete description 
of the world at T in conjunction with a complete formulation of the laws 
entails every subsequent truth), and S1 is the total state of the world at T1, 
then one of the following conditionals must be true: 
 








(2) If A were to do X at T
2
, then some natural law that actually obtains 
would not obtain. 
(3) If A were to do X at T
2
, then either S
1
 would not have been the total 
state of the world at T
1
, or some natural law that actually obtains 
would not obtain. (244) 
 
The rest of their argument can be restated as follows: 
 
(4)  If (1) is true, then (via FP) A cannot do X at T
2
 
(5)  If (2) is true, then (via FL) A cannot do X at T
2
.  
(6)  If (4) and (5) are true, then it follows that if (3) is true, then A cannot do 
X at T
2
.   
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hence, 
(7)  If determinism is true, then A cannot do anything other than what he 




Van Inwagen argues that neither (1) nor (2) is entailed by the truth of determinism.  The 
reason for this is that if A were to do X at T2, determinism would not entail that a natural 
law that actually obtains did not obtain.  This is so because it could rather be the case that 
the total state of the world was not S1.  Similarly, if A were to do X at T2, determininism 
would not entail that S1 was not the state of the world.  This is so because it could rather 
be the case that a natural law that actually obtains did not.  Hence, neither (1) nor (2) are 
entailed separately by determinism.  It follows from this that the conjunction of (1) and 
(2) is also not entailed by determinism.   
At this point van Inwagen’s objection becomes sketchy but I shall now try to 
clarify it.  We can see that the falsity of (1) and (2) render (4) and (5) trivially true.  From 
(4), (5) and (6) we can derive: 
 
(6’) If (3) is true, then A cannot do X at T2. 
 
Van Inwagen would not deny the truth of (3), (6) or (6’).  What he would question is 
what role FP and FL play in getting us from (6) to (7).  (3) is a basic statement of the 
thesis of determinism and van Inwagen has already provided a Beta argument for 
indeterminism that employs a similar premise (that argument excerpted in Section 4.2.1).  
What may allow us to get from (6) to (7) is a disjunctive principle like the following: 
 
(FPvL) For any action Y, agent S, and time T, if it is true that if S were to 
do Y at T, EITHER some fact about the past relative to T would 
not have been a fact OR some natural law which actually obtains 
would not obtain, THEN S cannot do Y.7 
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Using FPvL we can get: 
(6’’) If (3) is true, then (via FPvL) A cannot do X at T2. 
Whether this would entail indeterminism (i.e., whether (3) and (6’’) entail (7)) is 
uncertain because it is uncertain how FPvL can function within a logical proof.  (Can it 
be cited as rule as Alpha, Beta, and Beta-Prime can be?  If so, how?)  How a formal proof 
can be constructed using FPvL is not immediately apparent.  Failing this, we cannot 
determine whether this proof would rest (implicitly or explicitly) upon the validity of a 
rule like Beta.  Because of this, Fischer and Ravizza have failed in their effort to show 
that incompatibilists do not have to rely on a Beta-like rule. 
4.3. Implications of Beta 
In this section, I discuss what van Inwagen takes to be the implications of Beta.  
Namely, that we cannot perform three types of actions: actions that we find morally 
reprehensible; actions that we very much want to do with no countervailing reason not to; 
and actions that an agent regards as the only sensible act.  Since most actions fall into 
these three categories, we are seldom able to do otherwise.  Fischer and Ravizza question 
whether we are actually unable to do otherwise in these three cases.  The argue that there 
is always a relevant temporal interval in which countervailing desires can arise or in 
which what I refer to as existential angst can arise allowing us to do otherwise.  I argue 
that, even though van Inwagen is inclined to agree with Fischer and Ravizza here, van 
Inwagen’s account does not allow for the possibilities Fischer and Ravizza describe.  
Additionally, van Inwagen argues that even if Fischer and Ravizza are correct, it will not 
entail that we are able to do otherwise for an appreciably large amount of actions. 
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4.3.1. Why Beta Implies That We Are Seldom Able to Do Otherwise  
Since incompatibilists must accept Beta, they must also admit that there are few, 
if any, occasions upon which an agent can exercise free will.  Van Inwagen argues for 
this by showing that if Beta is valid it precludes agents from acting otherwise for three 
general types of acts:  1) refraining from performing acts which agents find morally 
reprehensible; 2) performing acts that agents very much want to do with no 
countervailing desire not to do it; and 3) if an agent regards an act as the one obvious 
thing to do or the only sensible act, the agent cannot do anything but perform that act.  
For the first type of act, van Inwagen offers a conditional to support his argument: 
 
C If X regards A as an indefensible act, given the totality of relevant 
information available to him, and if he has no way of getting further 
relevant information, and if he lacks any positive desire to do A, and 
if he sees no objection to not doing A (again, given the totality of 




As an example, van Inwagen offers the act of lying about someone’s scholarly work (call 
it act A).  Van Inwagen finds such an act reprehensible and would never perform it under 
normal circumstances.  He does not contend that, though he finds the act morally 
reprehensible, he would never under any circumstances perform this act (he would 
perhaps perform the act if it in turn would prevent World War III).  However, in such 
circumstances van Inwagen would have a positive desire to do A which is precluded by C.   
 In an important passage, van Inwagen discusses what it would be like if C were to 
be violated.  Suppose van Inwagen himself performed act A even though he found it to be 
morally reprehensible and had no positive desire to do A and no objection to not doing A.  
Perhaps van Inwagen had suddenly changed his mind or went berserk.  The important 
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proviso van Inwagen makes is that if any circumstances can be given for justifying the 
performance of A, a nonoccurrence of such circumstances can be included into the 
antecedent of C (226).  With this in mind, van Inwagen argues that C is something “very 
like” a necessary truth.  One can no more perform an act one finds morally reprehensible 
(as defined by C) than one can draw a round square. 
 At this point, van Inwagen introduces Beta-prime, a Beta-like rule of inference 
whose validity he argues rests on rule Beta (as he cannot imagine anyone accepting the 
validity of Beta and rejecting the validity of Beta-prime): 
 
Rule Beta-prime:  From N x, p and Nx, (p ⇒ q) deduce N x, q. (227) 
 
Here, “N x,p” stands for “p and x now has no choice about whether p”.  Van Inwagen 
uses Beta-prime to support the conclusion that agents can not perform acts they find 
morally reprehensible.  The argument is as follows: 
 
N I, I regard A as indefensible.  (In the sense ascribed in C) 
N I, (I regard A  as indefensible ⇒ I am not going to do A) 
hence, 
N I, I am not going to do A. 
 
 
The first premise states that I now have no choice about whether I regard A as being 
indefensible as described in C.  He argues that I have no choice about the matter because, 
like most of my beliefs and attitudes, it is something I just find myself with (227).  It is 
conceivable that I may be able to change my attitude about A over a considerable stretch 
of time, but not in the span of time under consideration.  The second premise is a 
necessary truth described in C.  From these two premises, Beta-prime is used to yield the 
conclusion that if I find an act morally indefensible then I cannot perform that act. 
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 Van Inwagen investigates what it would be like to actually perform an act which 
one finds indefensible.  It must mean that there is a future of open possibilities available 
to that person and in at least one of those futures he performs the indefensible act.  This, 
van Inwagen argues, is incoherent.  If I consider an act A indefensible, then I cannot give 
a description of future events that are coherently connected to the present in which I 
proceed to perform A. 
 Rule Beta-prime’s connection with incompatibilism is given in the following 
argument: 
 
(1) If the rule Beta-prime is valid, I cannot perform an act I regard as 
indefensible. 
(2) If the rule Beta is valid, the rule Beta-prime is valid. 
(3) Free will is incompatible with determinism only if Beta is valid. 
 hence, 
(4) If free will is incompatible with determinism, then I cannot perform 
an act I regard as indefensible.  (229)  
 
 
 After discussing the first type of acts in which we are unable to do otherwise, van 
Inwagen briefly considers the remaining two.  The second type of acts are those that we 
desire greatly to perform with no countervailing desire not to perform them.  The 
example van Inwagen uses here is that of Nightingale in C. P. Snow’s novel the Masters.  
Since I am not familiar with the novel, I will create an example of my own.  Consider the 
following scenario, which I shall refer to as the Game Show Story.  Jane is a contestant 
on a television game show in which she competes with another contestant to answer trivia 
questions for cash rewards.  After the host of the game show asks a question, the first 
contestant to buzz in with a correct answer will receive 200 points.  If a contestant buzzes 
in with an incorrect answer, 75 points are deducted from the contestant’s score.  The 
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winner then receives the opportunity to answer one bonus trivia question for the reward 
of $100,000.  The game is a close one and Jane finds herself ahead by 100 points with 
one question remaining.  She is a terrific fan of the game show and has often watched it 
in the company of friends at her home.  While doing so, she has observed other 
contestants in her situation and has argued among her friends over the best strategy to 
employ.  General agreement had been made that, in that situation, the leader should buzz 
in as soon as possible and attempt to answer the final question.  If the leader answers 
correctly, the leader will win.  If the leader answers incorrectly, the opponent will still 
have to answer correctly in order to win the game (since the leader will still be ahead 
after the 75 points are deducted for answering incorrectly).  Jane has promised her friends 
that if she were in that situation she would buzz in no matter what.  She desires very 
strongly two things.  One, to get the chance at winning the $100,000; and two, to not 
embarrass herself in front of her friends who are watching at home by not buzzing in.  
The host begins to ask the question and Jane is focused on her buzzer.  She will not 
consider whether she knows the answer to the question and then buzz, but rather will save 
the mental processing of the question until after she has buzzed in. 
 In the scenario of the Game Show Story, van Inwagen would argue that Jane has 
no choice about whether or not she will press her buzzer after the question is read.  It is 
open to speculation as to whether she will buzz in before her opponent, but her pressing 
her buzzer is inevitable.  And, once she has pressed the buzzer, it is false that, given the 
truth of the Game Show Story, she could have done other than press the buzzer.  Still, 
let’s suppose that Jane has refrained from pressing the button.  Say, she had a panic attack 
and fainted.  Or suddenly, as the question was being asked, she came to the realization 
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that she was too materialistic and decided to let the opponent have a shot at winning by 
buzzing in first.  In cases such as these van Inwagen would argue as he had earlier in the 
case of C.  Any coherent explanation for Jane’s not pressing the button can be excluded 
in the example. Say, amend the Game Show Story to include that Jane does not have a 
panic attack nor does she decide that she is too materialistic.  With this in mind, we have 
the following instance of rule Beta-prime: 
 
N Jane, the Game Show Story is true. 
N Jane, (the Game Show Story is true ⇒ Jane is going to press the buzzer) 
 hence, 
N Jane, Jane is going to press the buzzer.  (Or, Jane is going to press the 




This example and argument can be expanded to include any action which agents very 
much desire to perform with no countervailing desires or reasons not to perform it. 
 Van Inwagen provides a Telephone Story as an example of the third types of acts 
for which agents cannot do otherwise, acts which an agent regards as the one obvious 
thing to do or the only sensible act.  This story is similar to events we encounter in our 
everyday lives.  Van Inwagen sits at his desk grading papers and the telephone rings.  He 
was not expecting the phone to ring but neither was he expecting it not to ring.  Without 
reflection or deliberation, van Inwagen puts down his pen and answers the phone.  Again, 
if any circumstances can be imagined for not answering the phone, the story can be 
amended to exclude that circumstance.  Given this, the argument is as follows: 
 
N van Inwagen, The Telephone Story is true. 
N van Inwagen, (The Telephone Story is true ⇒ van Inwagen is going to 
answer the phone). 
hence, 
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N van Inwagen, van Inwagen is going to answer the phone.  (Or, van 
Inwagen is going to answer the telephone and he has no choice about 
whether he will answer the phone.)   (232) 
 
 Van Inwagen argues that since our normal, everyday situation is represented in 
this Telephone Story, it is not clear how many of the occasions of everyday life count as 
“making a choice”.  When I wake in the morning I seem to be faced with the choice of 
getting up and going to work or staying in bed for the day.  After some reflection, I see 
that staying in bed (say) will cause me to lose my job.  Since this is unacceptable (I need 
the money), going to work is the only sensible thing.  An apparent choice has turned, 
upon reflection, to be no choice at all.  Van Inwagen would argue that I could not have 
done other than get out of bed and go to work.  The relevance of this is shown in the 
following excerpt: 
 
There are, therefore, few occasions in life on which--at least after a little 
reflection and perhaps some investigation into the fact--it isn’t absolutely 
clear what to do.  And if the above arguments are correct, then an 
incompatibilist should believe that on such occasions the agent cannot do 
anything other than the thing that seems to him to be clearly the only 
sensible thing.  (232)  
 
  
 There are some cases, however, when it is not clear to an agent what to do (even 
when “all the facts are in” (233)).  Van Inwagen lists three such cases.  The first are 
characterized by vacillation, the second by moral struggle, and the third by indecision.  
The first case is quickly examined by van Inwagen.  These are the “Buridan’s Ass”, 
“Lady-and-tiger” or “vanilla/chocolate” cases in which each available alternative is 
indistinguishable relative to the relevant decision making criteria.  I am sent to the video 
store by my wife to rent Shakespeare in Love.  I notice that there are two copies of the 
film in the video store and each are equally accessible to me.  No amount of reflection 
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will allow me to conclude that either copy of the film on the video store shelf is better for 
me to choose than the other. 
 Van Inwagen later argues (235) that in cases of this sort we are not exercising free 
will but are instead abdicating choice in favor of an arbitrary internal decision making 
mechanism.  In such cases we do not have control over the result of the arbitrary process 
used to determine which alternative is chosen.   
 The second case is characterized by moral struggle (though not every case 
involves morality).  These are cases of duty versus inclination or cases of general policy 
versus momentary desire.  Examples here are easily generated.  Consider the case of the 
dieter who must decide whether to give in to the momentary desire to eat a chocolate 
doughnut or abstain from doing so in order to fulfill his long term goal of fitting into the 
army uniform he had not worn in ten years.  Or, the case of a married man who is 
tempted by a beautiful woman.  He would like to fool around with her but he would also 
like to be faithful to his wife.  
 The third case in which the agent is not sure what to do is characterized by 
indecision that is a result of an agent having incommensurable values.  The question that 
confronts the agent in examples of the third case is “What sort of human being shall I be? 
or What sort of life shall I live?” (234).  The conflict is one between a life of rational self-
interest (narrowly construed to include only what is traditionally associated with “selfish” 
activities) versus a life of gift and sacrifice.  These questions do not presuppose a set of 
values but rather are the questions we ask ourselves when determining what values we 
will accept.  So, when deciding on a career the question would not be “Which profession 
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would enable me to have lots of girlfriends?” for this question presupposes a value.  
Rather, the relevant question is “What type of person would I be should I choose either?” 
 Since van Inwagen has argued that in cases of the first type we are not really 
presented with a choice, there are actually only two types of cases in which agents can 
exercise free will.  The incompatibilist must therefore admit that there are few occasions 
which agents can do other than what they do.  Having discussed van Inwagen’s second 
main thesis, I now turn to a discussion of Fischer’s and Ravizza’s objections to it. 
4.3.2.  The Perils of Restrictive Incompatibilism 
Fischer and Ravizza address the implications van Inwagen draws from the 
validity of Rule Beta.  To do so, they first consider the three cases in which van Inwagen 
had argued that agents are not able to do otherwise: the case of morally indefensible 
action, the case of unopposed inclination, and the case of unreflective action.  Van 
Inwagen’s argument for each relies on either the condition van Inwagen has labeled as C 
(see previous sub-section) or a similar condition that parallels C.  Fischer and Ravizza 
first discuss the case of unopposed inclination. 
 Van Inwagen’s argument in support of this is as follows:   
 
(1) NX, X has an unopposed inclination to do A.   
(2) NX, (X has an unopposed inclination to do A ⇒ X is going to do A.) 
hence, 
(3)  N X, X is going to do A. 
 
 
The second premise, Fischer and Ravizza argue, relies on the following condition C2 that 
parallels C: 
 
(C2) If X very much desires to do some act A given the totality of relevant 
information available to him, and if he has no way of getting further 
relevant information, and if he lacks any positive desire to perform 
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any act other than A, and if he sees no objection to doing A and 
refraining from doing anything else (again, given the totality of 
relevant information available to him), then the person is not going 
to do anything other than A.  (248). 
 
 
C2 can only support the second premise, however, if C2 is what Fischer and Ravizza call 
power necessary for the relevant agent.  That is, only if C2 is true and the agent has no 
choice about C2 being true. 
 Fischer and Ravizza argue that C2 has two interpretations, each of which is 
inadequate for different reasons.  On one interpretation, C2 is power necessary but does 
not support the second premise.  On the other, the second premise is supported but at the 
cost of C2 being rendered implausible.  Consider the first possible interpretation C2*:   
 
(C2*) It is not possible that the following state of affairs obtain:  that X 
performs an act other than A without having any desire to perform 
such an act. (249) 
 
 
Fischer and Ravizza support this interpretation by arguing from the basic idea that actions 
are distinguished from mere events in virtue of being preceded in a suitable manner by 
volitions.  Volitions, in turn, must also be based in a suitable manner on desires.  It 
follows from this that it would be impossible for an agent to perform an action without 
having some desire to do so.  However, this interpretation does not imply the second 
premise: 
 
(2) N X, (X has an unopposed inclination to do A ⇒ X is going to do A.) 
 
 
Fischer and Ravizza provide an example in which C2* is true and (2) is false.  This 
example depends upon there being what they term a “relevant temporal interval” (249) 
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between the moment X has the unopposed inclination and the moment A would be 
performed during which X is able to generate an alternate desire.  To reconsider the Game 
Show Story in the previous section, we can imagine that Jane has a strong desire to press 
the buzzer but during “some temporal interval” between that moment and the moment 
she would have pressed the buzzer, Jane develops a desire to not press the button.8  In 
this case, C2* would be true because if she had not developed an opposing desire she 
would have pressed the buzzer.  (2) is false because at some moment Jane had an 
unopposed inclination to press the buzzer yet she did not in fact press the buzzer (because 
she subsequently developed an opposing desire before she could act on the original 
desire). 
 Now consider the second interpretation of C2: 
 
(C2**) If X does not desire to do other than A, X cannot do other than A. (249) 
 
 
Under this interpretation, C2 does indeed support (2).  However, it does so at the price of 
plausibility.  Fischer and Ravizza argue that an agent having no desire to perform an 
action does not preclude him from performing the action because the agent could always 
generate relevant desires to motivate him to perform the action.  Fischer and Ravizza 
provide an example of this desire generation in the following excerpt: 
 
Just about anybody can summon up the worry that he is not free to do 
otherwise.  That is, one can worry that, despite the pervasive intuitive 
feeling that frequently we have genuine freedom to do various things, we 
do not in fact have such freedom. (250) 
 
 
It is just such a worry that can cause Jane to decide to not press her button after she had 
developed a previously unopposed inclination to do so.  At one point, Fischer and 
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Ravizza would argue, Jane had an unopposed inclination to press her button.  This entails 
that at that moment she had no desire to do other than A.  However, subsequently, 
existential angst (if you will) caused her to generate a desire to prove that she was not a 
pawn of fate by refraining from pressing the buzzer.9  So it seems that in cases of 
unopposed inclination we are able to act otherwise. 
 Fischer and Ravizza use the above argument as a blueprint for their attack against 
van Inwagen’s remaining two cases, that of morally indefensible action and the case of 
unreflective action.  They provide two possible interpretations for the relevant “C” claim 
and shows that if these interpretations are true then they do not imply the second premise 
of the relevant argument.  If the second premise is held to be true, then the relevant “C” 
claim is shown to be implausible.  They conclude in the former that agents are able to 
perform morally indefensible actions (just to show that they are free to perform the 
action, as it were).  In the latter, they conclude that agents are able to refrain from 
performing unreflective actions.  Fischer’s and Ravizza’s emphasis in this section of the 
paper is on morally indefensible actions, so I shall turn my attention there. 
 Fischer and Ravizza give two examples of agents who perform acts they consider 
morally indefensible.  The first is that of St. Augustine stealing pears as a youth.  Though 
Augustine did see the theft as having some desirable consequences (namely, the “thrill of 
having partners in sin”), he still performed the action that (it can be argued) he found to 
be morally indefensible.  They opine that Augustine could have been motivated by a 
perverse sort of freedom or power -- “a freedom to ignore the Good” (254). 
 The second example is taken from the writings of Dostoevsky.  In Crime and 
Punishment, the character Raskalnikov contemplates killing and robbing an old 
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pawnbroker even though he knows that it is morally indefensible.  Despite his moral 
aversion, he is able to commit the crime.  In this case, Raskalnikov seems to commit the 
act “precisely to see if he can do it:  he wants to discover if he has the power to ignore 
moral prohibitions; he wants to know if he is free to do the morally indefensible.” (255).  
These two examples are used to underscore the position that agents can do otherwise in 
cases of morally indefensible actions.   
Fischer and Ravizza have argued that van Inwagen’s three cases in which agents 
are unable to do otherwise are flawed because there is always the chance for the agent to 
develop a relevant counter-desire.  Van Inwagen responds to this by arguing that even if 
this is true, it would result in few additional cases in which an agent could have done 
otherwise. 
4.3.3. When the Will is Not Free 
Van Inwagen responds to Fischer’s and Ravizza’s criticism that the validity of 
Beta does not entail that we are able to act otherwise as seldom as van Inwagen claims.  
Originally, van Inwagen had argued that there are at least three general types of cases in 
which we are unable to do otherwise: cases of morally indefensible action, unopposed 
inclination, and of unreflective action.  Fischer and Ravizza argued that in those three 
cases there can be a “relevant temporal interval” during which desires can arise (perhaps 
via what I have termed “existential angst”) which would enable the agent to do otherwise.  
In the current paper under consideration (VI(b)), van Inwagen agrees with the basics of 
Fischer’s and Ravizza’s criticism and amends his original position.  However, van 
Inwagen argues that this does not entail that we are able to do otherwise as often as 
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Fischer and Ravizza would like.  We can see why van Inwagen concludes this by 
examining the cases of morally indefensible actions. 
 Consider two examples that Fischer and Ravizza provided - that of St. Augustine 
and that of Raskalnikov.  Each performs an action they consider indefensible.  Each has 
done so in an attempt to show that they were not pawns of fate (perhaps).  Augustine 
stole the pears to show that he was free from the Good, and Raskalnikov committed his 
murder to show that he was beyond good and evil.10  Whether these examples work or 
not depends upon when Augustine and Raskalnikov developed their desires to prove their 
freedom.  In order for it to be a counterexample to van Inwagen’s position, there must 
have been some point at which they held their respective potential actions to be morally 
indefensible and had no such desires to prove their freedom.  If this were not so, the 
actions would not count as ones they found morally indefensible as outlined by C 
 
C If X regards A as an indefensible act, given the totality of relevant 
information available to him, and if he has no way of getting further 
relevant information, and if he lacks any positive desire to do A, and if 
he sees no objection to not doing A (again, given the totality of 
relevant information available to him), then X is not going to do A. 
 
 
because C precludes the possession of positive desires to perform the indefensible act.  
Therefore, the desires must have arisen, to use Fischer’s and Ravizza’s phrase, during 
some “relevant temporal interval” between the moment that, say, Augustine determined 
that stealing pears was an indefensible act and the moment he actually stole the pears.   
 Van Inwagen is willing to concede that his argument is flawed (or at least not 
obviously true).  However, he is quick to point out that this does not imply that agents are 
able to perform a significantly higher number of free actions for two reasons.  First, van 
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Inwagen argues that cases when “existential angst” arises in the consideration of morally 
indefensible actions are rare.  Second, even in cases where an agent has “existential 
angst” when considering an indefensible action, rarer still are the instances in which the 
agent then proceeds to commit the indefensible action.  Therefore, van Inwagen’s overall 
claim that free actions are very rare still holds. 
 Oddly, van Inwagen does not take issue with the role of the “relevant temporal 
interval” in Fischer’s and Ravizza’s arguments.  As I have mentioned earlier in a 
footnote, van Inwagen has set up the conditionals (the C statements) in such a manner as 
to exclude ex hypothesi the strategy that Fischer and Ravizza employ.  Van Inwagen 
argues that C is something like a necessary truth and instructs that if any circumstances 
can be given for justifying the performance of an indefensible act then the nonoccurrence 
of such circumstances can be included into the antecedent of C (226).  So, the antecedent 
of C can be amended as follows:  
 
If X regards A as an indefensible act, given the totality of relevant 
information available to him, and if he has no way of getting further 
relevant information, and if he lacks any positive desire to do A, and if he 
sees no objection to not doing A (again, given the totality of relevant 
information available to him), and if there is no relevant temporal interval 
between the moment X regards A as an indefensible act and the moment at 
which the final choice about whether A is performed such that X can 
generate a desire to perform A, and if X does not have a case of existential 
angst, then X is not going to do A. 
 
 
 In addition to this defense, van Inwagen could also argue that cases of existential 
angst violate the condition that the agent has no way of getting further relevant 
information concerning A.  I do not immediately see how a future desire (in whatever 
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form it may take) to perform A is not considered relevant information concerning the 
indefensibility of A.   
 I am not yet entirely convinced by my move.  Fischer and Ravizza could argue 
that though the case of existential angst is relevant to the argument in general and to the 
actual performance of the indefensible act in particular, it is not relevant to the 
indefensibility of the action itself and is thus not precluded by C.  However, even if my 
objection can be answered by Fischer and Ravizza because the existential angst is not 
relevant to the indefensibility of the act, I think the problem of existential angst is a part 
of the totality of relevant information available to the agent.  Because of this, Fischer’s 
and Ravizza’s objection that we are actually able to do otherwise in cases of morally 
indefensible acts (as defined by van Inwagen) may not hold.   
 But let us entertain the “relevant temporal interval” employed by Fischer and 
Ravizza further.  Fischer and Ravizza seem to be relying upon something like the 
following statement (in the case of morally reprehensible actions): 
 
At any moment in time, no matter how small the moment, an agent is able 




If this is true, and if the possibility of a “relevant temporal interval” is excluded via the 
relevant conditional statement, then it will be true that an agent cannot perform an action 
he finds morally reprehensible only at the exact moment that he succeeds in not 
performing the morally reprehensible action.  At every second of time previous to that, 
the “relevant temporal interval” objection would come into play and the agent would be 
able to generate a perverse desire to perform the act he finds reprehensible.  Even if this 
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is admitted to be the case, however, agents would not be free to do otherwise appreciably 
more than they are under van Inwagen’s because of the arguments given previously in 
this section.12  This can be shown utilizing the Game Show Story used in section 4.3.1.  
(This example is one of an action that one desires greatly to perform with no 
countervailing desire not to perform it rather than that of a morally reprehensible action, 
but it will still illustrate the relevant point.)13 
 Jane stands posed at the podium with her finger upon her buzzer.  She has a very 
strong desire to press the buzzer and no desire to not press the buzzer.  The final trivia 
question will be asked in four seconds.  During those four seconds, Jane can develop a 
perverse desire to not press her buzzer.  Though it can be admitted that Jane has this 
power, it will seldom be the case that she actually does so.  Additionally, once the desire 
not to press the buzzer arises, fewer still will be the cases in which Jane will heed the new 
desire and fail to press the buzzer. 
 To recap, I do not agree that Fischer and Ravizza have shown that agents can 
perform morally indefensible actions (as they are defined by van Inwagen).  However, 
even if Fischer’s and Ravizza’s criticism is correct (and van Inwagen certainly thinks that 
it is), the number of free actions an agent could perform would not significantly increase. 
4.4. Beta and Moral Responsibility – The Classical Tradition 
In this section I consider the question of whether or not van Inwagen’s account of 
moral responsibility resides in the classical tradition.  Though he has argued that we are 
seldom able to do otherwise, van Inwagen does not think that this results in an inability to 
hold agents responsible in a great amount of cases.  This is so because of something that 
Fischer and Ravizza refer to as the tracing principle.  This principle states that we can 
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hold an agent responsible even in cases in which he could not have done otherwise 
provided there was a time when the agent could have foreseen the future action and could 
have arranged events such that it did not occur.  Fischer and Ravizza question van 
Inwagen’s account because it seems that most of our actions are determined by our 
character that is in turn determined at an early age by our upbringing and our 
surroundings.  Holding agents responsible in such cases seems to go against our every 
day ideas of responsibility and accountability.   
4.4.1. When Can We Be Held Responsible? – Van Inwagen 
Van Inwagen discusses what implications his conclusions have for questions of 
moral blame.  Van Inwagen uses “drunk driver” cases to show that the classical tradition 
should not be committed to the thesis that an agent can be held accountable for a state of 
affairs only if he either intentionally brought that state about (or could have refrained 
from bringing it about) or if that agent foresaw that the state would obtain unless he 
prevented it and that he was able to prevent it.  It can be argued that a drunk driver who 
swerves into oncoming traffic neither set out to do so nor could he have prevented it (due 
to his intoxication).  Though it is true that he could have refrained from getting drunk, the 
actual outcome was not foreseen by the agent.  Obviously, however, we would still hold 
the drunk driver responsible for his action.  Van Inwagen claims that this relationship 
between blame and free will can be expressed as follows: 
 
An agent cannot be blamed for a state of affairs unless there was a time at 
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This does not imply that we are responsible for all of the consequences of our actions but 
rather only those that are in some sense foreseeable.  To return to the case of the drunk 
driver, he knew before he started drinking that he would be driving later.  It was 
foreseeable that his chances of causing an accident would be greatly increased.  
Therefore, he is a candidate for responsibility.  Suppose that the individual in question 
were an alcoholic and on that particular night he could no more refrain from drinking and 
driving than a rock could refrain from falling to Earth when dropped.  Then there must 
have been some point after the time he took his first drink that he could see that he was 
on the road to alcoholism (and all the “evils” associated with it, like drunk driving).  
Because of this, he is held responsible for the accident.  I will see if van Inwagen’s 
position is unassailable by examining objections raised by Fischer and Ravizza. 
4.4.2. Questions About Responsibility – Fischer and Ravizza 
Fischer and Ravizza then turn to showing that restrictive incompatibilists like van 
Inwagen cannot provide a satisfying theory of moral accountability while still remaining 
within the classical tradition.  The classical tradition holds that there is an intimate 
connection between free will and moral responsibility such that if there were no free will 
(and no one was ever able to do otherwise) then there would be no moral responsibility.  
This suggests that any state of affairs for which an agent can be held responsible must be 
able to be “traced” back to a prior free action performed by the agent (259).  Fischer and 
Ravizza refer to this as the “tracing principle” and do not think that it bodes well for 
restrictivists who wish to remain within the classical tradition. 
 Since the restrictivist claims that we are free in at most three types of situations 
(Buridan cases, cases in which duty conflicts with inclination, and situations of conflict 
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between incommensurable values), he is committed to showing that any and all states of 
affairs for which an agent can be held responsible must be traceable back to one of those 
three types of situations.  The restrictivist can hold that the conflict situations 
characterized by two of the three situations (the latter two situations) are the ones through 
which an agent’s character is formed.  Following from this, the agent can still be held 
responsible for actions that are produced by his character.  As an example, consider the 
case of the drunk driver who is an alcoholic as described in the previous section.  He is 
held responsible for the accident because it resulted from the character he has built up (by 
becoming an alcoholic).  Fischer and Ravizza spot a flaw in this reasoning, however. 
 
Much of our character results from the habituation we receive in early life, 
and these portions of our character don’t seem to be necessarily connected 




Fischer’s and Ravizza’s point here is that an agent cannot be held responsible for actions 
that result from his character if that character was formed via “habituation we receive 
early in life”.  Since presumably most of an agent’s character is formed through such 
habituation, is seems that the cases in which an agent can be held responsible are even 
rarer than the restrictivist claims.   To illustrate his point, Fischer and Ravizza provide the 
example of a young woman named Betty.   
 Betty was raised in a rural community where patriotism and American pride is 
prevalent.  Growing up, Betty has this pride and patriotism instilled within her and a 
conflict never arises which could cause her to call her patriotism into question.  While 
traveling in a foreign country, Betty is approached by a foreign agent.  The agent asks 
Betty to betray her country in return for some monetary profit.  Betty finds treason to be 
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morally indefensible and immediately turns down the agent.  In this case, Betty’s action 
can be said to have flowed from her character.  However, the restrictivist must claim that 
Betty’s action is not worthy of praise because it cannot be traced back to a free action for 
which Betty was responsible.  Fischer and Ravizza argue that this is absurd because such 
a conclusion “runs directly counter to our actual practices of holding people responsible” 
(261).  Because of this, the restrictivist position is outside that of the classical tradition.   
Fischer and Ravizza have argue that the restrictivist position does not rest within the 
classical tradition because the restrictivist position entails consequences in the realm of 
moral responsibility that are not acceptable within the classical tradition.  As I show in 
the next sub-section, van Inwagen does not agree with this assessment. 
4.4.3.  Moral Responsibility – Van Inwagen 
Van Inwagen responds to Fischer’s and Ravizza’s criticism that states that 
restrictivism entails that we can seldom if ever be held morally accountable for what we 
have done.  Van Inwagen has earlier argued that an agent can be held morally 
accountable for an action that he could not have at the time refrained from performing if 
it can be shown that the agent is accountable for having the inability.  This is exemplified 
by the case of the drunk driver who is an alcoholic.  Though he could not have refrained 
form getting drunk in that particular instance, he can still be held responsible because 
(presumably) he at one point made a free choice which ultimately resulted in his 
becoming an alcoholic.  Fischer and Ravizza would agree with this example but argue 
still that restrictivism entails that agents can seldom be held responsible.   
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 As may be recalled, Fischer and Ravizza reach this conclusion after they consider 
the following:  
 
Much of our character results from the habituation we receive in early life, 
and these portions of our character don’t seem to be necessarily connected 
with situations of conflict between duty, inclinations, or incommensurable 
values. (260)  
 
 
Also recall Fischer’s and Ravizza’s example of patriotic Betty.  Our actual practices of 
assigning moral responsibility would require us to praise Betty for declining to commit 
an act of treason.  However, the restrictivist would be forced to argue that Betty’s action 
is not morally praiseworthy because it was an expression of her character and her 
character was not a result of free choice by Betty.  Fischer and Ravizza argue that this 
conclusion is absurd and, as such, the restrictivist is not within the classical tradition in 
the debate concerning free will. 
 Van Inwagen takes issue with Fischer’s and Ravizza’s claim that our actual 
practices of assigning moral responsibility would require us to praise Betty for her action 
because of a certain asymmetry inherent in those practices.  This asymmetry is “between 
bad and good or between approval and disapproval” (VI(b) 108).  Cases in which moral 
responsibility is ascribed are typically those that involve states which ought not obtain.   
In other words, the typical cases of moral responsibility are those in which blame is 
attributed to an agent rather than a positive credit.  Because of this, in order for Fischer 
and Ravizza to reach their conclusion they must provide a counterexample that involves 
blame being attributed to an agent rather than praise.  Unless and until they are able to do 
so, van Inwagen is not excluded from the classical tradition. 
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 I do not consider Fischer’s and Ravizza’s appeal to our everyday practices of 
holding agents morally responsible to be a legitimate move on their part.  Even if the 
asymmetry that van Inwagen appeals to was nonexistent, Fischer and Ravizza must still 
contend with the idea that our everyday practices of holding agents morally responsible 
are not solely based upon whether an agent is actually responsible for the action.  Rather, 
there are also forward looking consequentialist reasons for praising Betty’s action 
regardless of whether Betty herself is worthy of such praise.  It is not immediately 
obvious that philosophers in the classical tradition would not agree that Betty is unworthy 
of praise if they are told the story in its entirety.  At the very least, there would not be 
anything resembling uniform agreement that her action is praiseworthy relative to her 
history.  What they may agree upon, however, is that praising Betty’s action would have 
beneficial effects because such praise is likely to influence others to act patriotically.   
Additionally, Peter Strawson argues in “Freedom and Resentment”15 that 
discovering the thesis of determinism to be true should not deter us from holding reactive 
attitudes towards one another.  Among these reactive attitudes are ascriptions of moral 
responsibility.  Even if Betty’s character was determined by her upbringing, Strawson 
would argue, we should still hold Betty responsible because that is the type of creatures 
we are.  We can not help but praise her for performing an action of which we approve 
because of the “human commitment to ordinary inter-personal relationships.”16  Though I 
do not agree with Strawson, his view shows that Fischer’s and Ravizza’s example of 
Betty does not serve to place van Inwagen outside the classical tradition because, even 
within that tradition, there is no wholesale agreement over whether or not we should hold 
Betty responsible for her act. 
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4.5. Concluding Remarks 
Even if libertarian theories of freedom and agency like Kane’s can be made 
intelligible, they face the problem of not being as free as they may like.  Even if we 
possess libertarian freedom, it may also be true that in almost every instance we are not 
able to do other than what we do.  At the beginning of this chapter I considered the 
problem that, even if we possess libertarian freedom, it may also be true that in almost 
every instance we are not able to do other than what we do.  Van Inwagen has argued that 
this is the case, but that it does not imply that we are only seldom responsible for our 
actions.  He has done so by appealing to Beta, a rule of inference.  I have given a 
representation of the philosophical positions held by Peter van Inwagen and John Martin 
Fischer and Mark Ravizza in their respective papers and I have demonstrated that Fischer 
and Ravizza have failed to show that incompatibilist philosophers are not required to rely 
on a rule of inference such as van Inwagen’s Beta.  I also have defended van Inwagen’s 
position that Beta implies that we are seldom if ever able to do other than what we do and 
have shown that Beta does not further imply that we can seldom if ever be held morally 
responsible for our actions.  Though van Inwagen’s position was originally seen by 
Fischer and Ravizza to be setting unwanted and unneeded limits to libertarian freedom 
because of the limited ability of agents to do otherwise, van Inwagen has successfully 
shown that this should not worry libertarians because under certain conditions agents can 
be held responsible even in those cases where it is true that agents could not have done 
otherwise. 
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4.6 End Notes 
 
1In O’Connor (1996), 219-238.   
 
2In O’Connor (1996), 239-269.  
 
3Van Inwagen (1994). 
 
4All subsequent page references in this chapter will refer to the O’Connor volume unless 
otherwise noted. 
 
5 This point is made in footnote 8 on 242.  The two arguments made by van Inwagen are 
the First Formal Argument and the second “Possible Worlds” argument.  Van Inwagen 
reveals how Beta supports these two arguments in VI(b). 
 
6 Van Inwagen argues that a similar argument can be made for the First Formal Argument 
that he employs in An Essay on Free Will. 
 
7 Van Inwagen does not explicitly mention a principle such as this, nor does his response 
to Fischer and Ravizza run exactly as I have stated here, but it does parallel the form of 
his objection on VI(b), 98-99. 
 
8It would seem that this type of objection is eliminated ex hypothesi by how van Inwagen 
has set up the argument.  Van Inwagen would have us add to the antecedent of C2 that 
there would be no “relevant temporal interval” during which X can change his mind.  
However, he risks weakening his claim to the point of being a trivial truth.  I discuss this 
possible defense of van Inwagen in section 4.3.3.   
 
9A similar response can be made here as in the previous footnote – see section 4.3.3.
 
10I took this description from footnote 11 (VI(b) 112).
 
11 This statement is my creation and is not taken from Fischer’s and Ravizza’s article. 
 
12 Namely, that even though the possibility to generate the opposing desire exists, very 
seldom will the desire actually be generated.  Further, in cases where the desire is 
generated it will very seldom be acted upon. 
 
13 Fischer and Ravizza discuss an objection along similar lines (251).  The objection is 
the complaint that they have simply missed van Inwagen’s point.  The objection is 
credited in a footnote to Sara Buss, Nancy Schauber, and Eleonore Stump.   
 
14 Of course it is always true that we could have arranged matters such that a particular 
state of affairs not obtain.  It is the foreseeability requirement that saves this from being a 
trivial truth. 
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15 In Watson, 59-80. 
 
16 Watson, 68. 
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5. Conclusion 
I started this work with the intention of examining and evaluating the 
indeterminist solution to the problem of free will and free agency.  To do so I examined a 
recent work of Robert Kane, one of the foremost indeterminist philosophers currently 
engaged in the discussion concerning the problem of free will.  Kane has offered a unique 
account that attempts to place libertarian philosophy upon the same footing as 
compatibilists regarding its scientific plausibility.  However, Kane’s account falls prey to 
criticisms that I have lodged in chapter two as well as criticisms lodged by other 
philosophers discussed in chapter three.  First, Kane does not provide an acceptable 
account of the significance of libertarian free will because he does not recognize the 
importance of the connection between the significance question and the intelligibility 
question.  Second, Kane is not able to account for the problem of moral luck regarding 
how indeterminate efforts of will are resolved.  Third, rather than strengthening the 
indeterminist position, Kane’s use of folk psychology serves to make compatibilist 
accounts of agency more intuitive.  Because of these, Kane has not been successful in 
providing an intelligible account of freedom. 
 For an indeterminist to meaningfully employ indeterminism in gaining freedom, 
he must answer the four objections I have discussed in chapter three.  Unlike the three 
objections in the previous paragraph, these four objections apply to any and all 
indeterminist accounts of freedom and not specifically to Kane’s.  An acceptable 
indeterminist account must have at least four features.  First and most importantly it must 
be able to use indeterminism in such a way that it is meaningful in the problem of free 
will.  Second, he must be able to show how actions performed by an agent are actions for 
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which the agent can be held responsible rather than actions that simply happen.  Third, he 
must satisfactorily explain why the indeterminism involved must be of the absolute 
random variety as opposed to the epistemically random.  Fourth, he must be able to 
explain how actions that are the result of an indeterminate process can be considered 
actions that are rational. 
 Even if an indeterminist philosopher were able to provide acceptable solutions to 
these problems, he would be faced with the additional problems examined in chapter four 
of this work.  As van Inwagen has argued, even if determinism were false it would not 
result in a significant amount of cases in which agents are able to do other than what they 
in fact do.  This inability to do otherwise in a significant number of cases would seem to 
indicate that we could only seldom be held responsible for our actions.  At least with 
respect to Fischer’s and Ravizza’s objections, van Inwagen has adequately argued that 
this is not the case.  Though we are unable to do otherwise in a significant number of 
cases, we can still be held responsible for actions that are determined by our character.  
Despite van Inwagen’s successful refutation of Fischer’s and Ravizza’s 
objections, all is not well with his account.  This is because I am not convinced that 
agents should be held responsible for actions that flow from their character, even if they 
are responsible for their characters.  I devote the remainder of this work to sketching a 
few additional problems for the indeterminist, including the problem of actions that are 
determined by character. 
5.1 Further Problems for Indeterminists 
In this section I briefly develop several additional objections to libertarians that 
rely upon indeterminism.  First, I question whether we should hold agents responsible for 
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actions that flow from their characters even on those occasions in which the agent is 
responsible for shaping his character.  Second, I use the concept of overdetermination to 
provide a rough sketch of a world in which universal determinism is true yet agents can 
still be held responsible for their actions.  In doing the latter, I question whether 
conditions such as Kane’s AP condition are relevant to the problem of free will. 
5.1.1 Responsibility and Actions Determined by Character 
 Both Kane and van Inwagen have discussed the topic of whether or not an agent 
can be held responsible for an action that flows from his character.  In the Martin Luther 
example Kane argued that agents could be held responsible for actions that flow from 
their character provided they are responsible (via a previous self-forming action or SFA) 
for possessing their current character. Luther’s past actions (including several SFA’s, of 
course) formed his character such that Luther both could not have done other than break 
from the Church of Rome and yet is responsible for his action.  That this is so is 
demonstrated by Kane’s UR condition for freedom of the will.  Recall that sub-condition 
U of UR indicates when an agent can be held responsible for an action that flows from 
his character:  
 
(U) for every X and Y (where X and Y represent occurrences of events 
and/or states) if the agent is personally responsible for X, and if Y is an 
arche (or sufficient ground or cause or explanation) for X, then the agent 
must also be personally responsible for Y. (Kane (1998), 35) 
 
In this context, Luther’s break with the Church of Rome is X while the totality of his past 
actions that determined his character (and that act as sufficient grounds for X) is Y.  
Because Luther is responsible for Y, he is also responsible for X. 
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 Van Inwagen argues similarly using the example of a drunk driver.  Once drunk, 
it seems we cannot hold the agent responsible for his decision to get behind the wheel and 
place his life and the lives of others in danger.  Van Inwagen argues that this is not the 
case because of the “tracing principle.”1  It is as follows: 
 
An agent cannot be blamed for a state of affairs unless there was a time at 
which he could so have arranged matters that that state of affairs not 
obtain. (O’Connor, 236) 
 
In the case of the drunk driver, we can hold him responsible for his act provided there 
was a time in the past at which point the he could have foreseen that his consuming 
alcohol might get him drunk and, once drunk, he might stupidly go for a drive.  Thus an 
agent’s ability to foresee the future action plays a part in his ability to arrange matters 
differently.  If he could not foresee the future action, he could not have taken precautions. 
This tracing principle works similarly to Kane’s sub-condition U.  In this case, driving 
drunk serves as X while Y is represented by the agent’s decision to continue to drink 
alcoholic beverages.  Since Y is sufficient grounds for X (X can be traced to Y), and since 
the agent is responsible for Y, the agent is also responsible for X.  Before continuing with 
this discussion, it would be helpful to make a few distinctions. 
5.1.2 ADC, AR and ANR 
To aid in discussion of this topic, I refer to actions that flow from an agent’s 
character as ADC (for actions determined by character).  Further, I distinguish between 
situations where the agent is responsible for his character (and hence responsible for the 
ADC) and situations where the agent is not responsible for his character (and hence not 
responsible for the ADC).  In the former cases, as typified by Kane’s use of the Martin 
Luther example and van Inwagen’s drunk driver example, the agent is responsible for the 
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ADC via the agent’s responsibility for the formation of the his own character.  These 
types of actions I refer to as AR (for agent responsible).  AR actions are ADCs for which 
the agent can be held responsible.   
The latter type of ADC includes cases in which an agent’s character is determined 
solely by his environment or his genes.  An example of this can be found in the film 
Ravenous.  The protagonist in the film is an officer in the United States armed forces 
during the Spanish-American War who, to escape being killed by the enemy, feigns death 
on the battlefield.  Thinking he is dead, the Mexican soldiers place him in a pile of dead 
bodies that include several of the officer’s posthumous subordinates.  American soldiers 
attack the Mexican position and the officer is able to sneak out of the pile and kill the 
commanders of the Mexican forces.  Because of his experience amongst the blood 
drenched dead soldiers, he is later unable to partake of the very rare prime rib served at a 
banquet in his honor.  In this example, the officer’s inability to eat the prime rib is an 
ADC but not one for which the officer is responsible.  I refer to this type of ADC as ANR 
(for agent not responsible).  An ANR is an ADC for which the agent is not responsible.   
It is important to note that AR and ANR refer to the sufficient grounds for the 
agent’s character, not the action that flows from the character.  Thus, as I argue in the 
next section, there may be examples of an ADC that is an AR but for which the agent is 
not responsible.  In these cases, the agent is responsible for his character (hence, AR), but 
he is not responsible for action that is determined by his character. 
5.1.3 The Perils of Character Building 
Generally, when AR actions are discussed there is an obvious and direct link 
between the actions that the agent has performed to build his character and the resulting 
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ADC.  In the Martin Luther case, Luther performs various character building actions that 
are of the same sort as his breaking with the Church of Rome.  His choosing to act 
piously and by what he views to be the correct religious standards determine an action in 
which he similarly acts piously and by those same religious standards.  Here the transfer 
of responsibility from the original acts to the later ADC is clear.  However, not all AR 
actions result in an ADC that is of a similar nature. 
 Consider the case of Swagger, a man of strict religious stature who has worked 
diligently to become a perfect Christian.2  He has an idea of what a perfect Christian is 
and sets his will towards performing actions that he thinks will help him achieve it.  His 
efforts to shape his own character are successful, so successful that we can say that he is 
the sole cause of his resulting character.3  This makes his resulting character of the AR 
variety.  Swagger’s character then determines several actions that are of a similar variety.  
He does not debate whether to go to church on Sunday or to go fishing, or if he does 
deliberate it is a mere pretence.  He will go to church.  Swagger will not steal money 
from the collection plate.  He will not reject his religion and become a Communist.  
However, Swagger is not omniscient.  His efforts to become the ideal Christian man go 
astray for two reasons.   
First, his conception of the perfect Christian could be unattainable, say, because it 
is not within the power of any human being to act so perfectly.  Because of this, his 
character shaping has had the unforeseen side effect of placing enormous amounts of 
stress and pressure upon him.  The stresses eat at him so much that he eventually 
performs a very un-Christian act with a prostitute in a motel on Airline Highway.  This 
action is an ADC, and the character that determined the action was AR.  Using Kane’s X 
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and Y, Swagger’s character building actions, Y, served as sufficient grounds for the un-
Christian act, X.  Because Swagger is responsible for Y, he is thus also responsible for X.  
Thus, we should hold Swagger responsible for the ADC.   
I find this unacceptable, at least within the limits of this example.  Ex hypothesi, 
once he had shaped his character Swagger could not have done other than perform the 
un-Christian act.  Again, ex hypothesi, he could not have foreseen that this un-Christian 
act would result from his character shaping.  Because of his inability to have foreseen the 
consequences his responsibility for the un-Christian action can be questioned.  This poses 
a problem for Kane’s condition UR because he does not account for this possibility.  This 
is less of a problem for van Inwagen, because according to the tracing principle 
responsibility can be attributed only if the agent could have arranged things so that the 
later action did not occur.  In order to arrange things differently, the agent must have been 
able to foresee that the later action could occur.  In the case of the drunk driver, that he 
could have foreseen that his drinking could lead to his driving drunk.  In the present case, 
that Swagger could have foreseen that his good intentions could lead to an un-Christian 
action.  Since his eventual action was not foreseeable in this version of the Swagger 
example, van Inwagen’s account can allow for Swagger not to be held responsible for the 
ADC even though Swagger is responsible for his character. 
Though van Inwagen’s tracing principle is capable of handling the Swagger 
example, the question of foreseeability can pose problems for van Inwagen.  Recall from 
chapter four that van Inwagen has argued that we are free to do otherwise on very few 
occasions and also that this does not entail that we can seldom be held responsible for our 
actions.  The latter is so because of the tracing principle.  Agents are unable to do 
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otherwise most of the time.  But, so long as their inability can be traced back to those 
actions for which they are responsible and regarding which it is true that they could have 
done otherwise, their responsibility for the earlier action is enough to make them 
candidates for being held responsible for the latter, determined action.  We can take the 
next step and actually hold the agents responsible so long as the determined action was 
foreseeable by the agent.  Van Inwagen must give a clear account of the criteria for 
foreseeability in order for his philosophy to be useful.  It is certainly true that Swagger 
did not foresee the future consequence of his action, but that does not imply that he could 
not.   
Suppose we learn something new about Swagger.  In addition to being very 
religious, he is also a practicing psychologist with an intimate knowledge of the frailties 
of the human mind.  Because of this, he has learned what happens to the mind when it is 
put under too much pressure.  In short, he is aware that it can cause agents to do other 
than what they normally do.  Additionally, he has treated several patients who have tried 
to live the ideal Christian life but have cracked under the tremendous pressure resulting in 
performance of un-Christian actions.  With this in mind, does Swagger qualify for being 
able to foresee that his road may lead to an un-Christian act?  He is certainly aware that it 
is a possibility.  Because of the many patients who have tried and failed, he may even 
consider it likely.  Still, he feels duty bound to follow the Christian ideal and ultimately 
breaks under the pressure.  Is his awareness that it was possible or likely enough to make 
the resulting un-Christian action foreseeable?  If so, then van Inwagen would (wrongly, I 
think) hold him responsible for the ADC.  If not, then it may be that (imperfect beings 
that we are) we may have adequate knowledge to foresee very little.  We may be able to, 
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say, foresee immediate consequences of our actions, but the longer the amount of time 
between the ADC and the actions that make the ADC an AR, the less likely it is that the 
agent could have foreseen what action would have resulted. 
A second reason why Swagger’s attempt to become an ideal Christian can go 
wrong is, even if it is granted that the ideal is attainable, the path to reaching it may be 
indeterminate.  It may be that being a good Christian is not something that you can strive 
to become, but rather only stumble upon while trying to do something else.  In the 
process of trying to reach his ideal, Swagger may unintentionally become something less 
savory all together.  The road to hell is said to be paved with good intentions.  Because of 
this, Swagger has no rationally necessary means that is associated with his adopted end.  
Again, because we are not omniscient beings, Swagger does not know this.  After much 
deliberation, he sets down and follows a path and begins to shape his character.  After 
much time has passed he recognizes that he is not making progress towards his end and 
has instead ended up shaping his character in a way that is not to his liking.  His efforts 
have resulted in shaping a certain character within him, a character that he does not 
necessarily want.  Once having done so, should we hold Swagger responsible for actions 
that flow from this character?   In this case I have not specified that Swagger could have 
foreseen that this might occur.  Because of this van Inwagen’s tracing principle may not 
apply.  I will now construct another case in which the tracing principle does apply. 
Bubba is an earnest young man who is disgusted by the political corruption that 
runs rampant in his state legislature.  He is so dismayed that he decides to run for the 
office of state senator for his district.  He manages to prevail in the election and once in 
office attempts to fight corruption wherever it appears.  It is a lonely battle, however, and 
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the enemy is strong.  He finds that the only way he can make progress is to trade votes.  
In exchange for supporting various bills that Bubba puts forth, a corrupt senator asks that 
Bubba support another bill.  Bubba recognizes that the bill that he will be forced to vote 
serves to fatten the pockets of both Bubba and the corrupt state senator.  Bubba initially is 
not concerned with money but does recognize that it has seduced many politicians before 
him.  If he accepts the bargain, he may well eventually become what he hates.  However, 
he may also make real progress and gain enough allies to rid the state legislature of 
corruption. With the intention of doing the latter, unfortunately, his decision to trade 
votes leads to the former.  Little by little, he is seduced by the money until his character is 
as corrupt as any of the others.  At each point, Bubba has attempted to do the right thing 
(or attempted not letting doing the wrong thing adversely affect his future character).  At 
each point, he fails.  In short, he ends up with a character that he does not want.  His 
efforts have missed the mark.  Though he did not want to become a corrupt politician, the 
possibility was foreseeable by Bubba.  Hence, according to van Inwagen’s tracing 
principle we should hold Bubba responsible for the latest act of corruption that is 
determined by his character.  Though he may constantly work to change his character and 
may actually eventually succeed in regaining his honesty, he is responsible for the 
unwanted actions that flow from his unwanted character.  I find this to be 
counterintuitive.  In cases like this, the agent seems to be acting against his will and 
should not be held responsible for the resulting actions even though his character was 
determined previously by his will.  
Each of these cases is one for which an ADC action that was AR did not result in 
an action for which we should necessarily hold an agent responsible.  What I leave 
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unaddressed is the question of how often cases such as these arise.  I think that without 
proper deliberation there is always the possibility that we will perform an action that we 
either do not foresee, or one that was foreseeable but not likely, or one that was 
foreseeable and likely but an action that the agent did not want to result from his careful 
character shaping actions.  Because of this, there is no immediate reason for believing 
they do not occur with frequency. 
5.1.4 Compatibilism 
I now want to address several problems associated with the compatibilist position.  
I realize that compatibilists have for the most part not been discussed directly in this 
work, and I only do so here in an attempt to describe a further problem for incompatibilist 
philosophers.  This problem deals with what Kane calls condition AP (for alternative 
possibilities), the condition that in order for an action to be considered free it must be true 
that the agent could have (in some sense of this phrase) done otherwise.  I question what 
relevance the libertarian interpretation of alternate possibilities has to the problem of free 
will.4 
Libertarians typically paint a rather bleak picture of a world that is governed by 
universal determinism.  I would like here to sketch an alternate, at the very least less 
bleak, picture of that world in which agents may be held responsible for their actions.  I 
do so by utilizing the concept of overdetermination.  Before doing so, it would be fruitful 
to clarify what is meant by overdetermination. 
5.1.5 Overdetermination 
Overdetermination occurs when there is more than one cause (C1, C2... Cn) that is 
sufficient for bringing about a particular effect (E) and more than one of the causes occur 
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simultaneously.  For example, there are several causes that are sufficient to bring about 
the effect of my death.  In this case, let C1 be a murderer shooting me in the heart using a 
rifle and let C2 be my accidentally ingesting a deadly poison that is mislabeled as 
medicine (but which takes some time to work).  Both C1 and C2 are each alone sufficient 
to cause E, my death.  Since they are each individually sufficient they are, of course, 
jointly sufficient to cause E.  Suppose that I accidentally ingest the poison but at the exact 
moment before I expire I am also shot in the heart by the murderer.  Sadly, I am dead.  
But which cause acted to bring about E?  In this case, had C1 not occurred then C2 would 
have brought about E.  Had C2 not occurred, C1 would have brought about E.  Either way 
(in this example), my death was inevitable.  Both C1 and C2 determine E and, hence, E is 
said to be overdetermined.  Overdetermination, however, does not serve to diminish 
responsibility.  Even though it is true that had the murderer not fired his shot I would still 
be dead, we would not relieve him of the responsibility for my murder.  Similarly, even 
though I would have died anyway had I not accidentally ingested the poison, my loved 
ones can hold the company that mislabeled the medicine responsible for my death. 
5.1.6 Overdetermination and Compatibilism 
A compatibilist philosopher can appeal to overdetermination in an attempt to 
explain why conditions like AP (conditions that require that we “could have done 
otherwise”) are not important in ascribing responsibility to agents.  Instead of arguing 
over how alternative possibilities should be interpreted, compatibilist philosophers can 
just reject it altogether.  The compatibilist can agree that if determinism is true it is also 
true that we can never under any circumstances do other than what we in fact do because 
our actions are caused by the conjunction of events that occurred before we were born 
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and the laws of nature.  In this way determinism serves as C1 for effect E (any particular 
action we perform).  However, this does not close the book on the question of 
responsibility.  Just because our actions have one set of sufficient conditions that actually 
obtain does not preclude there being another set of sufficient conditions, C2, that also 
serve to simultaneously determine our actions.  In this case C2 can be the (perhaps folk 
psychological) decision making process agents employ when they determine which 
action to perform.  Because of the overdetermination at work, agents can be held 
responsible for their actions 
 There is an asymmetry between the two examples that must be acknowledged.  In 
the case of the murderer and my accidentally poisoning myself, if either the C1 or the C2 
did not occur I would still end up dead.  I am not sure how in the latter case we can 
sensibly talk about C2 occurring in the absence of C1.  The question is whether the 
agent’s decision to act did play any causal role since there is no possibility of C1 not 
determining any resulting action.  In the determined world, C1 is always present.  
Additionally, in the first case the sufficient causes were not casually related to each other 
in the way the latter case is held to be.  My choosing to perform an act is casually related 
to determinism such that the forces of determinism cause my desire.  This asymmetry is 
important and must be sufficiently explained.  Though such an explanation would go 
beyond the scope of this present work, I do offer a suggestion. 
Even if it is granted that they should be treated the same, we are still faced with 
the problem of why, in the case of agents deciding to act, we should break the causal 
chain at that point and not extend it back to before the birth of the agent.  In this case C2 
collapses into C1.  Some explanation must be given for why the causal chain should be 
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considered broken before it extends in such a manner.  But what would this explanation 
be?  In truth, I do not know.  It may be that we have to simply acknowledge and accept 
that for various reasons (our biological complexity, our capability of higher thought, etc.) 
we should treat each other differently than we treat other (in this context possibly lesser) 
creatures for which questions of responsibility do not arise.  Though it is true that the past 
and natural laws determine our actions, it is also true that we are the ones that perform 
these actions and that they are actions that we intend to perform.  To the extent the two 
coincide, our actions being determined by the past and the laws of nature and also being 
actions that we want or desire to perform, overdetermination results and we can be held 
responsible for the action.  This use of overdetermination is hardly satisfactory and must 
be discussed and examined further.  It was not my intent to do so here.  Rather, my 
intention is to suggest it as a possibility.   
If overdetermination can be used in allowing for agents to be responsible for 
actions in a determined world, then the compatibilist can safely reject conditions such as 
AP.  In the next sub-section, I briefly discuss what would result from doing just that.   
 5.1.7 Could Not Have Done Otherwise 
“Genie,” says Max while firmly holding the bottle that serves as its 
home, “when I was in high school I desperately wanted to ask Janice to 
the prom but I did not do so.  I blame all of my failures as a man since 
then upon that decision.  If only I had the courage, if only I could have 
asked, my life would have been vastly different.  Vastly better without this 
doubt gnawing at me at every moment.  Genie, I wish that I had the 
chance to do it all over again.  I want the chance to ask her to the prom 
again.”  
The genie slowly spreads his arms apart and then brings his hands 
together in a thunderous clap.  “Your wish is granted.”   
Max braces himself, not knowing what to expect.  How radically 
different would his life be now that he does not have to live with the 
memory of this mistake any longer?  Moments pass, but nothing happens.  
“Genie?  Did it work?  I don’t feel any differently,” Max hesitantly asks. 
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“Yes, master.  I have turned back time to the exact moment of your 
decision.  Unfortunately, you again decided not to ask her to the prom.  
Did you expect otherwise?” 
 
I conclude with a discussion of what exactly is lost when conditions that require 
alternative possibilities are abandoned.  Usually, when we wish for chance to do 
something over again, like Max, we mean that we want to somehow have known back 
then what we know now and use this information to alter the choices we have made.  
Max does not simply want the chance to ask Janice to the prom again.  The genie granted 
him that and Max was not satisfied.  What Max wanted was to change the past such that 
his younger self somehow had knowledge of his future failures and used that knowledge 
to motivate him to ask Janice to the prom.  However, this would not have been the same 
situation.  Max would not be doing it all over again, for if he were (given the truth of 
determinism) it would turn out just as it did the first time.  Even were he to make the 
same wish countless times the results would be the same.  This is because there must be 
some difference in the past in order to make a difference in his younger self’s decision.  
What would it look like if he were to decide to ask her to the prom?  His younger self 
would not choose to ask Janice to the prom unless there was, say, a reason to ask her that 
he did not originally consider or if, say, the genie magically altered the younger Max’s 
character.  Again, it would not be a case of doing it all over again because the two 
situations would be different.   
Though this has been framed from the point of view of a compatibilist, the 
incompatibilist who relies upon indeterminism to gain freedom should also question 
whether or not conditions such as AP are relevant to discussions of freedom.  The short 
story of Max given above would undoubtedly be quite different for these libertarians.  It 
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may be that Max’s wish results in his younger self deciding to ask Janice to the prom.  
The younger Max, intending not to ask Janice to the prom, suddenly does the opposite.  
This would result in the familiar problem raised by Double’s objection from rational 
explanation in chapter three.   
I am not arguing that either side is better off here, but rather that the problems 
associated with alternate possibilities are great and the reward for the indeterminist is 
small.  If alternative possibilities are allowed, we have actions that could have happened 
otherwise.  The indeterminist is then faced with a similar objection that is typically 
lodged against the compatibilist.  In the case of the compatibilist, the challenge is to 
provide an intelligible account of freedom and agency that results in determined actions 
equating with free choices.  In the case of the indeterminist, the challenge is to provide an 
intelligible account of freedom and agency that results in indetermined actions equating 
with free choices.  Though the problems are on the surface different, I think they stem 
from the same larger problem of (and I agree with Kane here) how materialistic accounts 
of the self can allow for responsible action by agents, whether determined or not.  
5.2 Concluding Remarks  
I have devoted the bulk of this concluding chapter to sketching possible problems 
for the libertarian philosopher who relies solely upon indeterminism to obtain freedom.  
First, I have questioned the idea that we should hold agents responsible for actions that 
flow from their character as long as they are somehow responsible for having their 
character.  In doing so, I have examined conditions given by Kane and van Inwagen for 
holding agents responsible in these cases.  I have found Kane’s UR condition 
unacceptable, and I have argued that van Inwagen must provide acceptable criteria for 
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foreseeability in order for his version to work.  Next, I have attempted to paint a more 
favorable picture of a world governed by determinism using the concept of 
overdetermination.  This was done in an attempt to show that conditions such as Kane’s 
AP (alternative possibilities) condition are not necessary for free will.  Additionally, I 
have argued that we do not lose anything meaningful when we discard conditions like AP 
because given the chance to do everything over again we would proceed to do everything 
in the exact same way we have done so previously.  Each of these problems requires 
more development and investigation, however, before they could be considered threats to 
the incompatibilist position. 
5.3 End Notes 
 
1 It is actually Fischer and Ravizza that refer to this as the “tracing principle.”  Van 
Inwagen does not refer to it in this manner, but I will do so for the sake of simplicity.  
 
2 I don’t pretend to know what an ideal Christian is nor have any expertise in philosophy 
of religion in any form.  If the use of the ideal Christian is distasteful, the ideal of a 
perfectly moral creature can be substituted in its stead. 
 
3 It is doubtful that a situation such as this could exist because there are so many factors 
that influence us in ways that we cannot predict.  I set this aside in order to make the 
example simpler. 
 
4 Of course, I have already discussed extensively cases where agents could not have done 
otherwise yet are still responsible for their actions.  These are cases in which the agent is 
responsible for his inability to do otherwise and are safely ignored in this section. 
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